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SYNOPSIS
The company law harmonization program of the European Com-
munity has as its principal components the coordination, safeguarding,
protection and equivalence necessary to protect shareholders, creditors,
customers, potential investors and, last, but not least, the employees of
companies in the Member States. The goals are to remove obstacles to
the establishment of businesses by Common Market citizens within the
entire Community and to harmonize the company laws of the Member
States. While the removal of obstacles has proven to be uncomplicated,
the second goal of harmonization is politically sensitive as a result of
the different degrees of employee participation that exist in the Mem-
ber States. While some Member States do not have any scheme for
employee participation at all, others have extensive legislation in this
area. Organizations of employers and employees take different views
not only as to the extent of harmonization, but also as to the methods
and means to achieve such harmonization.
These differences became apparent when the Commission pro-
posed harmonization of company laws involving employee participation
systems. Out of the original ten company law directives envisaged,
seven have been enacted by the Council of Ministers because they har-
monize primarily technical aspects of company law. The remaining
three directives, the Fifth Company Law Directive, the Ninth Com-
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pany Law Directive, and the Tenth Company Law Directive, have en-
countered considerable difficulties and discussions continue. These Di-
rectives involve or affect employee representation in companies and,
therefore, have been strongly criticized, especially in countries where
such representation is nonexistent or practiced only to a limited extent.
In particular, the Fifth Company Law Directive, the creation of a uni-
form structure for companies within the EEC, has been blocked in the
Council of Ministers. Other projects affected by the problem of em-
ployee participation are the proposed Directive on the Information and
Consultation of Employees, especially with regard to transnational cor-
porations, and the Statute for a European company.
In the attempt to complete the internal market by the end of 1992,
the Commission has taken new steps to overcome the hurdle of em-
ployee participation. As a vehicle for this attempt the Commission has
chosen the European company. The Commission presented a Memo-
randum for comment to the Council, the European Parliament, and the
two sides of industry in 1988. This Memorandum outlined possibilities
for worker participation in the company decision-making process. The
Memorandum invited views on its broad proposals before presenting a
new, formal draft of a Statute for a European company.
This article discusses existing difficulties with the proposed com-
pany law directives which have not yet been passed by the Council. In
addition, the projects for a Directive on Information and Consultation
of Employees and the Statute for a European company are examined.
Since it can be expected that the new proposal made by the Commis-
sion will eventually lead to a compromise solution to the problem of
employee participation in European companies, it is interesting to ob-
serve the past and present discussions of this topic. Obstacles to agree-
ment are still great, but European governments will have to overcome
their differences on the proposals made by the Commission in order to
enable the Community to proceed with small steps on the road to 1992.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Treaty of Rome brings the general matter of company law
within the scope of the European Economic Community ("EEC"). The
liberal trade philosophies which influenced the drafting of the docu-
ment provided for the free flow of goods between the Member States. It
was assumed that the existence of independent company laws were a
potential obstacle to the free flow of goods. between the Member states,
and thus the Treaty of Rome provides for the harmonization of com-
pany laws. Article 54.3(g), in conjunction with Article 54.2, is the au-
thority for the harmonization of company laws commenced by the
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Commission of the European Communities ("Commission"). Article
54.2 states:
In order.., to achieve a stage in attaining freedom of estab-
lishment as regards a particular activity, the Council shall,
acting on a proposal from the Commission, in co-operation
with the European Parliament and after consulting the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee, issue directives acting unani-
mously until the end of the first stage and by a qualified
majority thereafter.'
Article 54.3 states:
The Council and the Commission shall carry out the duties
devolving upon them under the preceding provisions, in
particular:
(g) by coordinating to the necessary extent the safe-
guards which, for the protection of the interests of
members and others, are required by Member States of
companies or firms within the meaning of the second
paragraph of Article 58 with a view to making such
safeguards equivalent throughout the Community.2
The program of company law harmonization has been constructed
on this foundation. The principal components of harmoniza-
tion-coordination, safeguards, protection, and equivalence-are ap-
parent in the language of Article 54.3(g). Legislation of the Member
States, designed to protect shareholders and "others" (creditors, custom-
ers, potential investors, and workers) by reducing their exposure to un-
acceptable risk, is to be harmonized throughout the EEC.
Two goals were to be achieved through the Treaty of Rome. The
first was the removal of immediate obstacles to the establishment of
businesses by common market citizens within the entire community,
and the second goal was the harmonization of the company laws of the
Member States. 3 The first of these goals proved fairly simple to accom-
plish. The second, however, presents continuing difficulties. Citizens of
' Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 38 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) (original version) [hereinafter Treaty
of Rome]; B II Encyclopedia of European Community Law, European Community
Treaties (Sweet & Maxwell) B10005, B10051 (current version in effect) [hereinafter
Encyclopedia of EC Law].
Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, at 39; Encyclopedia of EC Law, supra note 1, at
B10052.
' See General Program for the Abolition of Restrictions on Freedom of Establish-
ment, 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 1335 (July 14, 1988).
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a Member State (including business associations formed under its laws)
are generally able to extend their business into the territory of any
other Member State. A "market" thereby arises for company laws
which offers the business the greatest degree of latitude. On the other
hand, "Company law Delawares" were to be avoided. The European
scheme of harmonizing company laws is based on a "federal" ap-
proach; in other words, the harmonization results in little influence by
the Member States in these matters. The safeguards contained in na-
tional regulations are politically sensitive and/or in evolution. The pro-
cess of harmonization is as much political in character as it is technical.
1.1.
The original program to harmonize the company laws of the
Member States encompassed ten directives. 4 Seven directives have been
issued by the Council of Ministers ("Council"). The remaining three
have either been proposed by the Commission or are under discussion.
Other legislative initiatives that could significantly affect the oper-
ations of companies in the EEC are the proposal on the dissemination
of information to and consultation with worker's representatives,' the
European Economic Interest Grouping,6 and the model charter of a
European Company (a "Societas Europea" ("S.E.")).
7
Despite obvious difficulties, the Commission has been successful in
obtaining the Council's approval of seven company law directives,
which have since been implemented by the Member States. These di-
rectives are as follows:
4 Id.
' COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, DIRECTIVE ON PROCEDURES
FOR INFORMING AND CONSULTING THE EMPLOYEES OF UNDERTAKINGS WITH COM-
PLEX STRUCTURES, IN PARTICULAR TRANSNATIONAL UNDERTAKINGS, COM No.
423 FINAL (Oct. 23, 1980), published in 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 297) 3 (1980),
as revised, DIRECTIVE ON PROCEDURES FOR INFORMING AND CONSULTING EMPLOY-
EES, COM No. 292 FINAL (July 8, 1983), published in 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C
217) 3 (1983), correcting some of the translations, COM No. 292 FINAL/2 (Jan. 9,
1984) [hereinafter Vredeling Proposal]. See also Employee Information and Consulta-
tion Procedures, 16 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 1 (Supp. No. 3, 1983).
6 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2137185 of July 25, 1985 on the European
Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG), 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 199) 1 (1985). See
infra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
' COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, DRAFT REGULATION ON
STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY, COM No. 268 FINAL (Aug. 25, 1989), pub-
lished in 57 Common Mkt. L.R. 120 (1990); DRAFT DIRECTIVE ON A STATUTE FOR
A EUROPEAN COMPANY: COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL
FOR A COUNCIL DIRECTIVE COMPLEMENTING THE STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COM-
PANY WITH REGARD TO THE INVOLVEMENT OF EMPLOYEES IN THE EUROPEAN COM-
PANY, COM No. 268 FINAL (Aug. 25, 1989), published in 57 Common Mkt. L.R.
274 (1990). See infra notes 192-262 and accompanying text.
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The First Directive, Directive 68/151/EEC of March 9, 1968,
provides for coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the
interests of members and others, are required by Member States of
companies, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of
the Treaty,' with a view to making such safeguards equivalent
throughout the Community.'
8 Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, at 40; Encyclopedia of EC Law, supra note 1, at
B10054/8.
11 J.O. CorMMrs. EUR. (No. L 65) 8 (1968). The First Directive has been imple-
mented in Member States by the following national legislation:
Belgium: Loi modifiant la I6gislation relative aux soci&ts commerci-
ales du 6 mars 1973, Moniteur Belge/Belgisch Staatsblad 7681 (23 juin
1973), 1973 Pasinomie 176.
Denmark: Act No. 503 of Nov. 29, 1972, to amend the Companies
Act 1930, 119-1972 Handelsmin. 1755. Lov om aendring af lov om ak-
tieselskaber, Law No. 282 of 9 June 1982, Lovtidende A, Haefte 46, at
649 (17 June 1982).
France: Ordonnance No. 69-1176 du 20 dgcembre 1969, Modifant la
loi No. 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966 sur les socitgs commerciales, 1969
Journal Officiel de la Rgpublique Francaise [J.O.] 12679, 1970 Dalloz-
Sirey, Lbgislation [D.S.L.] 17. Dgcret No. 69-1177 du 24 d~cembre 1969,
Modifant le dgcret No. 67-236 du 23 mars 1967 sur les socitgs commerci-
ales et le dgcret No. 67-237 du 23 mars 1967 relatif au registre du com-
merce, 1969 J.O. 12680, 1970 D.S.L. 18.
Germany: Gesetz zur Durchfilhrung der Richtlinie des Rates der
Europiischen Gemeinschaften zur Koordinierung des Gesellschaftsrechts,
1969 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] 1 1146.
Greece: Presidential Decree No. 419/86 revising Law No. 2190/
1920 on private limited companies and socitgs en commandite par actions,
1986 Greek Official Journal FEK 197A (Dec. 10, 1986). Presidential De-
cree No. 409/86 revising Law No. 2190/1920 on public companies lim-
ited by shares, 1986 Greek Official Journal FEK 191A (Nov. 28, 1986).
Italy: Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica de dicembre 1969,
Modificazioni alle norme del codice civile sulle societa per azioni, in acco-
mandita per azioni e a responsabilita limitata, in attuazione della direttiva,
9 marzo 1968, n. 151, del Consiglio dei Ministri delle Comunita europee,
1969 Raccolta Ufficiale delle Leggi e dei Decreti della Repubblica Ital-
iana [Rac. Uff.] 4661.
Luxembourg: Loi du 23 novembre 1972 portant adaptation de la loi
du 10 aofit 1915 concernant le regime des socitgs commerciales telle
qu'elle a &6 modifige dans la suite a la directive no. 68/151 du Conseil
des Communautgs Europgennes du 9 mars 1968, Memorial A No. 72
1586, 1586-1594 (13 dgcembre 1972).
Netherlands: Wet van 29 april 1971 houdende aanpassing van de
Nederlandse wetgeving aan de eerste richtlijn van de Raad van de
Europese Gemeenschappen van 9 maart 1969 inzake het vennootschap-
srecht, 1971 Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [S.] 285.
Portugal: Codigo das Sociedades Commerciais, Decreto-Lei No. 262/
86 (2 Setembro 1986) Codigo do Registo Comercial Decreto, Lei No.
403/86 (3 Dezembro 1986).
Republic of Ireland: European Communities (Companies) Regula-
tions, 1973, No. 163.
United Kingdom: The European Communities Act, 1972, ch. 68, §9.
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The Second Directive, Directive 77/91/EEC of December 13,
1976, provides for the coordination of safeguards which, for the protec-
tion of the interests of members and others, are required by Member
States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Ar-
ticle 58 of the Treaty, with respect to the formation of public limited
liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital,
with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the
country.' 0
The Third Directive, Directive 78/855/EEC of October 9, 1978,
based on Article 54.3(g) of the Treaty, addresses mergers of public lim-
ited liability companies,"
"0 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 26) 1 (1976). The Second Directive has been
implemented in Member States by the following national legislation:
Belgium: Loi modifant les lois sur les socit~s commerciales, coordon-
nes le 30 novembre 1935 du 5 dfcembre 1984, Moniteur Belge/Belgisch
Staatsblad (12 d&cembre 84).
Denmark: Lov om aendring af lov om aktieselskaber, Law No. 282 of
-9 June 1982, Lovtidende A, Haefte 46, at 649 (17 June 1982).
France: Loi No. 81-1162 du 30 d~cembre 1981, relative A la mise en
harmonie du droit des socit~s commerciales avec la deuxifme directive
adopt~e par le conseil des Communaut~s europ~ennes, le 13 dcembre
1976, 1981 J.O. 3593, 1982 D.S.L. 17.
Germany: Gesetz zur Durchfiihrung der Zweiten Richtlinie des
Rates der Europiischen Gemeinschaften zur Koordinierung des Gesell-
schaftsrechts, 1978 BGB1 1959.
Greece: Presidential Decree No. 409/86 revising Law No. 2190/
1920 on public companies limited by shares, 1986 Greek Official Journal
FEK 191A (Nov. 28, 1986).
Italy: Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica de lo febbraio 1986,
Modificazioni alla disciplina delle. societA per azioni, in accomandita per
azioni, a responsabilita limitata e cooperative, in attuazione della direttiva
del Consiglio delle ComunitA europee n. 77/91 del 13 dicembre 1976, ai
sensi della legge 8 agosto 1985, n. 412, 1986 Rac. Uff. 76.
Luxembourg: Loi du 24 avril 1983 portant modification de la loi
modifife du 10 aofat 1915 concernant les soci&fts commerciales, M6morial
A, p. 864.
Netherlands: Wet van 15 mei 1981 tot aanpassing van de wetgeving
aan de tweede richtlijn van de Raad van de Europese Gemeenschappen
inzake het vennootschapsrecht, 1981 S. 332.
Portugal: Codigo das Sociedades Commerciais, Decreto-Lei No. 262/
86 (2 Setembro 1986).
Republic of Ireland: Companies (Amendment) Act, 1983, No. 13.
United Kingdom: Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, repealed by Compa-
nies Act, 1985, ch. 6.
x' 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 295) 36 (1978). The Third Directive has been
implemented in Member States by the following national legislation:
Denmark: Lov om aendring af lov om aktieselskaber, Law No. 282 of
9 June 1982, Lovtidende A, Haefte 46, at 649 (17 June 1982).
Germany: Gesetz zur Durchfiihrung der Dritten Richtlinie des Rates
der Europiischen Gemeinschaften zur Koordinierung des Gesellschaft-
srechts, 1982 BGBI 1 1425.
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The Fourth Directive, Directive 78/660/EEC of July 25, 1978,
based on Article 54.3(g) of the Treaty, addresses the annual accounts of
certain types of companies.1 2
Netherlands: Wet van 19 januari 1983 tot regeling van de fusie van
naamloze en besloten vennootschappen, 1983 S. 59.
Portugal: Codigo das Sociedades Commerciais, Decreto-Lei No. 262/
86 (2 Setembro 1986).
12 21 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 222) 11 (1978). The Fourth Directive has been
implemented in Member States by the following national legislation:
Belgium: Loi modifiant la loi du 17 juillet 1975 relative i la com-
patabilit6 et aux comptes annueles des entreprises - ler juillet 1983,
Moniteur Belge/Belgisch Staatsblad (8 juillet 1983). Loi modifiant les
lois, sur les socit~s commerciales, coordonnes le 30 novembre 1935 du 5
d&embre 1984, Moniteur Belge/Belgisch Staatsblad (12 d~cembre 1984).
Arrt6 royal portant ex~cution de la loi du 17 juillet 1975 relative i la
compatabilit6 et aux comptes annuels des entreprises, Moniteur Belge/
Belgisch Staatsblad (30 dfcembre 1975), erratum 12 septembre 1983,
Moniteur Belge/Belgisch Staatsblad (3 d~cembre 1983). Arrt royal
modifiant la loi du 17 juillet 1975 relative a la compatabilit6 et aux
comptes annuels des entreprises du 16 janvier 1986, Moniteur Belge/
Belgisch Staatsblad (28 janvier 1986). Arr~t royal modifiant l'arr&tt royal
du 8 octobre 1976 relatif aux comptes annuels des entreprises, Moniteur
Belge/Belgisch Staatsblad (19 octobre 1976), errata 12 septembre 1983,
Moniteur Belge/Belgisch Staatsblad (3 dcembre 1983).
Denmark: Lov om visse selskabers aflaeggelse af arsregnskab m.v.,
Law No. 284 of 10 June 1981, Industrimin. Lov om aendring af lov om
aktieselskaber og lov om anpartsselskaber, Law No. 285 of 10 June 1981,
J. No. 101-2-80.
France: Loi No. 83-353 du 30 avril 1983, relative a la mise en
harmonie des obligations comptables des commereants et de certaines
socit~s avec la IVe directive adopt~e par le Conseil des communautes
europ~ennes le 25 juillet 1978, 1983 J.O. 1335, 1983 D.S.L. 225. D~cret
No. 83-1020 du 29 novembre 1983, Pris en application de la loi No. 83-
353 du 30 avril 1983 et relatif aux obligations comptables des commer-
cants et de certaines socit~s, 1983 J.O. 3461, 1983 D.S.L. 532. Arr&tt du
27 avril 1982, Portant approbation du plan comptable g~nfral revise, 1982
J.O. 4355, 1982 D.S.L. 232.
Germany: Gesetz zur Durchfiihrung der Vierten, Siebenten und
Achten Richtlinie des Rates der Europ~ischen Gemeinschaften zur Koor-
dinierung des Gesellschaftsrechts (Bilanzrichtlinien-Gesetz-BiRiLiG),
1985 BGB1 I 2355.
Greece: Presidential Decree No. 419/86 revising Law No. 2190/
1920 on private companies and soci&tts en commandite par actions, 1986
Greek Offical Journal FEK 197A (Dec. 10, 1986). Presidential Decree
No. 409/86 revising Law No. 2190/1920 on public companies limited by
shares, 1986 Greek Official Journal FEK 191A (Nov. 28, 1986).
Luxembourg: Loi du 4 mai 1984 portant modification de la loi du 10
aofit 1915 concernant les soci&s commerciales, Memorial A No. 40 (10
mai 1984).
Netherlands: Wet van 7 december 1983 houdende aanpassing van de
wetgeving aan de vierde richtlijn van de Raad van de Europese Gemeen-
schappen inzake het vennootschapsrecht, 1983 S. 663. Besluit van 22 de-
cember 1983 houdende regels over de inhoud, de grenzen en de wijze van
toepassing in de jaarrekening van waardering van activa tegen actuele
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The Sixth Directive, Directive 82/891/EEC of December 17,
1982, based on Article 54.3(g) of the Treaty, addresses the division of
public limited liability companies.1"
The Seventh Directive, Directive 83/349/EEC of June 13, 1983,
based on Article 54 .3 (g) of the Treaty, addresses consolidated
accounts.14
The Eighth Directive, Directive 84/2253/EEC of April 10, 1984,
based on Article 54:3(g) of the Treaty, addresses the approval of per-
sons responsible for carrying out the statutory audits of accounting
documents. 5
waarde (Besluit waardering activa), 1983 S. 665. Besluit van 23 december
1983 tot vaststelling van modelschema's voor de inrichting van jaarreken-
ingen (Besluit modellen jaarrekening), 1983 S. 666.
Republic of Ireland: Companies (Amendment) Act, 1986, No. 25.
United Kingdom: Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, §§ 228-30, sched. 4.
13 25 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 378) 47 (1982). The Sixth Directive has been
implemented in Member States by the following national legislation:
- Portugal: Codigo das Sociedades Comerciais, Decreto-Lei No. 262/
86 (2 Setembro 1986).
Scissions are not permitted in Germany, Denmark, or the Netherlands and for this
reason the Sixth Directive is not applicable in these countries.
14 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 193) 1 (1983). The Seventh Directive has been
implemented in Member States by the following national legislation:
France: Loi No. 85-11 du 3 janvier 1985, relative aux comptes con-
solidus de certaines socit~s commerciales et entreprises publiques, 1985
J-O. 101, 1985 D.S.L. 78. Dcret No. 86-221 du 17 f~vrier 1986,
J.O.R.F. du 19 f~vrier Pris pour l'application de la loi No. 85-11 du 3
janvier 1985 relative aux comptes consolid~s de certaines socit~s commer-
ciales et entreprises publiques et portant dispositions diverses 'relatives A
l'Etablis sement des comptes annueles, 1986 J.O. 2729, 1986 D.S.L. 253.
Germany: Gesetz zur Durchfiihrung der Vierten, Siebenten und
Achten Richtlinie des Rates der Europaischen Gemeinschaften zur Koor-
dinierung des Gesellschaftsrechts (Bilanzrichtlinien-Gesetz-BiRiLiG),
1985 BGB1 I 2355.
Greece: Presidential Decree No. 419/86 revising Law No. 2190/
1920 on private limited companies and socit~s en commandite par actions,
1986 Greek Official Journal FEK 197A (Dec. 10, 1986). Presidential De-
cree No. 409/86 revising Law No. 2190/1920 on public companies lim-
ited by shares (partial implementation), 1986 Greek Official Journal FEK
191A (Nov. 8, 1986).
'5 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 126) 20 (1984). The Eighth Directive has been
implemented in Member States by the following national legislation:
Belgium: Loi relative A la r6forme du r~visorat d'entreprises du 21
f~vrier 1985, Moniteur Belge/Belgisch Staatsblad (28 f~vrier 1985).
Germany: Gesetz zur Durchfiihrung der Vierten, Siebenten und
Achten Richtlinie des Rates der Europiischen Gemeinschaften zur Koor-
dinierung des Gesellschaftsrechts (Bilanzrichtlinien-Gesetz-BiRiLiG),
1985 BGB1 I 2355.
Luxembourg: Loi du 28 juin 1984 portant organisation de la profes-
sion de r~viseur d'entreprises, MEmorial A No. 81 (23 aocit 1984). Grand-
Ducal Regulation du 16 aoat 1984, page 1346.
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These rather technical Directives were passed by the Council
without too many complications. Progress in company law harmoniza-
tion slowed when proposals for the Fifth Directive, 6 the Tenth Direc-
tive'" and an eventual Ninth Directive' 8 were presented by the Com-
mission. Obstacles included the difficult taxation problems and the
significant problem of worker participation.
1.2.
In modern European company law, the internal constitution of
corporations and the rights of shareholders cannot be ascertained sim-
ply by recourse to the appropriate company laws because these are, to
some extent, superseded by laws regulating worker-management rela-
tions. The "company law" has been effectively replaced by a "law of
enterprises." Consequently, the coordination of company laws necessa-
rily requires the coordination of co-determination statutes. Consultation
and information rights of workers are generally classified among the
desirable social benefits of national company laws which harmonization
was designed to protect.
The Treaty of Rome does not address the right of workers to par-
ticipate in co-determination. In the first decade of the Community's ex-
istence, co-determination was not a major issue in the coordination de-
bate. During that period, only one Member State, the Federal Republic
of Germany, had a comprehensive scheme of co-determination at the
board and management levels. Thereafter, Denmark and the Nether-
lands passed board-level co-determination legislation. Belgium, Luxem-
bourg and France introduced reforms creating works council co-deter-
mination. In Britain, a commission of experts urged the adoption of a
1" The Draft Fifth Directive was originally submitted by the Commission to the
Council on Oct. 9, 1972. See 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. C 131) 49 (1972); Proposal
for a Fifth Directive on the Structure of Socits Anonymes, 5 BULL. EUR. COMMUNI-
TIES 1 (Supp. No. 10, 1972) [hereinafter Proposal for a Fifth Directive]. An amended
proposal for a Fifth Directive was submitted by the Commission to the Council on
August 12, 1983. See 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 240) 2 (1983); The Structure of
Public Limited Companies: Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive, 16 BULL. EUR.
COMMUNITIES 1 (Supp. No. 6, 1983). The Draft Fifth Directive addresses the harmo-
nization of the structure of companies.
1" The Draft Tenth Directive was submitted by the Commission to the Council on
Jan. 14, 1985. 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 23) 11 (1985); Proposal for a Tenth
Council Directive Based on Article 54(3Xg) of the EEC Treaty concerning cross-bor-
der mergers of public limited companies, 18 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 1 (Supp. No.
3, 1985) (based on COM No. 727 FINAL (1984))[hereinafter Proposal for a Tenth
Directive]. The Draft Tenth Directive addresses cross-border mergers.
"8 A Draft Ninth Directive has not yet been submitted by the Commission to the
Council. The aim of the Draft Ninth Directive is to establish a special regime for
groups of undertakings.
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system of co-determination. Spain and Portugal adopted works council
legislation, and debates concerning board-level co-determination gave
reason to anticipate further advancement. In view of this legislative
tide, the Commission ventured to propose a range of co-determination
measures within the company law program.
1.3.
The, prospect of a European union has been discussed since the
early 1970's. In October 1972, the European Council confirmed the
objective of achieving a European union by 1980. However, in spite of
several expert reports, it proved impossible to attain such an objective
during the 1970's. In 1983, the European heads of state reaffirmed
their intention to strive towards achieving a European union in the
Stuttgart Declaration of June 19, 1983.19 At the time, this meant pri-
marily the strengthening and continuation of the development of the
Communities within the framework of the Treaty of Rome.
It was the European Parliament ("EP"), directly elected since
1979, that prompted a more fundamental approach to the matter,
namely through initiating amendments to the Treaty of Rome. In a
draft treaty adopted by the EP on February 14, 1984,2" the objectives
of European cooperation were redefined, and the tasks and powers of
the institutions of a European union were reformulated. This initiative
by the EP was a major impetus to the efforts to amend the European
treaties. Consequently, in February 1986, the procedure articulated in
Article 236 of the Treaty of Rome was implemented. Article 236 states:
The Government of any Member State or the Commis-
sion may submit to the Council proposals for the amendment
of this Treaty.
If the Council, after consulting the Assembly and,
where appropriate, the Commission, delivers an opinion in
favour of calling a conference of representatives of the Gov-
ernments of the Member States, the conference shall be con-
vened by the President of the Council for the purpose of de-
termining by common accord the amendments to be made to
this Treaty.
19 Solemn Declaration on European Union, 16 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 24
(No. 6, 1983).
20 Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C
77) 33 (1984); 17 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 7 (No. 2, 1984) [hereinafter Draft
Treaty]. For a description of the developments which led to the adoption of the Draft
Treaty, see Jacque, The Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, 22 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 19 (1985).
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The amendments shall enter into force after being rati-
fied by all the Member States in accordance with their re-
spective constitutional requirements.21
1.4.
In June 1984, the European Council in Fontainebleau created an
ad hoc Committee for Institutional Affairs. Its function was to make
suggestions for the improvement of European cooperation. The Com-
mittee recommended that a conference of the representatives of the gov-
ernments of the Member States convene to negotiate a draft European
Union Treaty. Finally, at the European Council's meeting in Milan in
July 1985, a majority of the Member States (overriding the views of
the United Kingdom, Denmark and Greece which were not in favor of
amending the Treaty) decided to convene an intergovernmental confer-
ence to revise the Treaty of Rome and other treaties, in order to speed
up decision-making procedures. New decision-making procedures ap-
peared all the more urgent in view of the enlargement of the Commu-
nity by the accession of Spain and Portugal.22 In order to amend the
Treaty of Rome and create new decision-making procedures, the Single
European Act was approved by the European Council in Hamburg in
December 1985.2" The Act was signed on February 17, 1986, by nine
Member States. Italy, Greece and Denmark signed it on February 28,
1986. The Single European Act has had far-reaching consequences.
On June 14, 1985, the Commission presented a White Paper pro-
gram requiring a huge legislative program for the completion of the
internal market.24 Most important is the commitment of all Member
States which have signed the Single European Act to the completion of
the Internal Market by 1992.25
2 Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, at 91; Encyclopedia of EC Law, supra note 1,
at B10171/21.
" De Zwaan, The Single European Act: Conclusion of a Unique Document 23
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 747, 764 (1986).
23 See 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987); Single European Act, 19
BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 1 (Supp. No. 2, 1986).
24 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL
MARKET: WHITE PAPER FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL,
COM No. 310 FINAL (June 14, 1985) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
The Treaty of Rome has been supplemented by the following provisions:
Article 8A
The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively
establishing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December
1992, in accordance with the provisions of this Article and of Articles 8 D,
8 C, 28, 57(2), 59, 70(1), 83, 99, 1 0 0 A and 100 B and without prejudice to
the other provisions of this Treaty.
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The approval of the Single European Act was itself a unique event
of major political importance. It reflects the readiness of the Member
States to develop further and reinforce cooperation among themselves.
Its more flexible decision-making instruments may be valuable in over-
coming the participation problem.2"
2. THE PROPOSAL FOR A FIFTH EEC COMPANY LAW DIRECTIVE:
STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC LIABILITY COMPANIES
Until recently, the draft Fifth Directive concerning the structure of
companies had been the main object of discussion regarding the intro-
duction of employee participation systems in EEC company law. The
proposals concerning the internal organization and structure of compa-
nies were heavily criticized and rejected, especially by Member States
that traditionally practiced the unitary system in their company laws,
i.e. having a single administrative organ (board of directors, conseil
d'administration). The reception of these proposals demonstrates the
limits of the harmonization efforts by the EEC due to employee partici-
pation systems. It is therefore interesting to observe the development of
the Fifth Directive.
2.1.
As part of its program to approximate the company law in the
Member States, in 1972 the Commission published the "Proposal for a
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers
in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is en-
sured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.
Article 8B
The Commission shall report to the Council before 31 December
1988 and again before 31 December 1990 on the progress made towards
achieving the internal market within the time limit fixed in Article 8A.
The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the
Commission, shall determine the guidelines and conditions necessary to
ensure balanced progress in all the sectors concerned.
Article 80
When drawing up its proposals with a view to achieving the objec-
tives set out in Article 8A, the Commission shall take into account the
extent of the effort that certain economies showing differences in develop-
ment will have to sustain during the period of establishment of the inter-
nal market and it may propose appropriate provisions.
If these provisions take the form of derogations, they must be of a
temporary nature and must cause the least possible disturbance to the
functioning of the common market.
30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1, arts. 13-15, at 7; Single European Act, supra
note 23, at 11.
28 See De Zwaan, supra note 22, at 764.
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fifth Directive to coordinate the safeguards which, for the protection of
the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of
companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of article 58 of
the Treaty, as regards the structure of soci6t~s anonymes and the pow-
ers and obligations of their organs."2
This first draft recommended that the decision-making organ of
shareholding companies in all Member States should have a dualistic
structure. That is, there should be a division of power between the su-
pervisory board and the management board as executive organ of the
company. The draft also demanded certain minimum guarantees for
the participation of employee representatives in decision-making
processes at the board level.28 The Member States had the option be-
tween two systems:
(1) In companies with more than 500 employees, two
thirds of the members of the supervisory organ are appointed
by the general assembly, and one third is appointed by the
workers or their representatives or upon proposals made by
the workers or their representatives; or
(2) The supervisory organ coopts its own members.
However, the general meeting or the representatives of the
workers may object to the appointment of a proposed candi-
date if the proposed candidate lacks the ability to carry out
his duties or if his appointment would cause an imbalance in
the supervisory body's composition with respect to the inter-
ests of the company, the shareholders and the employees. In
such case, an independent legal body decides on the
objection.
29
The draft was widely commented on and substantial changes pro-
posed. 30 Furthermore, the EP demanded important changes. The legal
27 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. C 131) 49 (1972); Proposal for a Fifth Directive,
supra note 16.
28 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. C 131) 49 (1972); Proposal for a Fifth Directive,
supra note 16.
29 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. C 131) 49 (1972); Proposal for a Fifth Directive,
supra note 16, art. 4.
11 See, e.g., Lutter, Die Angleichung des Gesellschaftsrechtes nach dem EWG-
Vertrag, 19 NEUE JURISTICHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 273 (1966). See also Conlon,
Industrial Democracy and EEC Company Law: A Review of the Draft Fifth Directive,
24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 348 (1975); Kohler, The New Corporation Laws in Germany
(1966) and France (1967) and the Trend Towards a Uniform Corporation Law for
the Common Market, 43 TUL. L. REv. 58 (1968); Niessen, Zum Vorschlag einer
"europdischen" Regelung der Mitbestimmungfzlr "nationale" Aktiengesellschaften, 2
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR UNTERNEHMENSRECHT 218 (1973); Pipkorn, Zur Entwicklung des
europdiischen Gesellschaftsund Unternehmensrechts, 136 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DAS
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committee of the EP even temporarily stopped discussion of the draft in
order to wait for a new proposal from the Commission. Replying to the
widespread criticism, and in order to explain its intentions more fully,
in 1975 the Commission presented the so-called "Green Paper."'"
2.2.
In the Green Paper, the Commission raises the rhetorical question
of why it has
proposed Community legislation in relation to the undenia-
bly controversial and difficult issue of the role of employees
in relation to the decision-making structures of companies?
Is this not an issue which should be left to the Member
States to handle in their own particular ways as an essen-
tially domestic matter?32
Answering this rhetorical but very valid question, the Commission re-
peats: "If progress is to be made towards a European Community in
the real sense of the word, a common market for companies is an essen-
tial part of the basic structure which must be created."3
The role of employees in decision-making structures of companies
is of central importance for the companies themselves, for employees
and their representative organizations, and for society at large. The ex-
isting differences between co-determination structures in the Member
States are an obstacle to rational reorganization of the legal structures
of enterprises across national frontiers. 4 After reporting in detail about
GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAIFTSRECHT '[ZHR] 499 (1972), 137 ZHR
35 (1973); Sonnenberger, Die Organisation der Aktiengesellschaften im Gemeinsamen
Markt, 1974 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [AG] 1; von der Groeben, Die Politik der
Europdiischen Kommission auf dem Gebiet der Rechtsangleichung, 23 NJW 359
(1970). The legality of the draft was questioned by the author in Conlon, The Draft
5th Directive - A Question of Legality, 125 NEW L.J. 39 (1975). See also Lang, The
Fifth Directive on the Harmonization of Company Law, 12 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
155 (1975); Malawer, Labor Law in the Common Market - Worker Participation &
Other Recent Developments, 11 NEW ENG. L. REV. 55 (1975).
3 Employee Participation and Company Structure in the European Community,
8 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 1 (Supp. No. 8, 1975).
32 Id. at 7.
3 Id. at 7.
"' Incorporation under a particular national system is a serious barrier to the ra-
tional restructuring of enterprises necessary to take advantage of community-wide mar-
kets. Transfer of domicile and merger across national borders are practically impossi-
ble. Suitable instruments to overcome these barriers are, in the opinion of the
Commission, the "[aipproximation of national laws applying to companies, through the
adoption of suitable directives, and the creation of wholly new Community company
law, such as the European Companies Statute and the Convention on International
Mergers." Id. at 8 (footnote omitted) (now to be embodied in the Tenth Directive).
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the existing co-determination systems in the Member States, the Com-
mission suggests that one-third of the board members should be em-
ployee-elected. Alternatively, Member States could opt for the Dutch
cooptation model. The Commission justifies the inclusion of such regu-
lations by claiming that past regulations of this kind have been included
in various legal provisions. Traditionally, these matters have not been
regulated by company laws because of the concept, based on economic
and social theories, that the relationship between company and employ-
ees is essentially a contractual relationship. Modern theories, however,
define the enterprise as a partnership between capital and labor. The
company laws of the Member States will gradually have to reflect these
changes which have led to "increasing recognition being given to the
democratic imperative that those who will be substantially affected by
decisions made by social and political institutions must be involved in
the making of those decisions.""
Despite this attempt by the Commission to give a well-founded
explanation for its aims, criticism of the draft continued.3" In particu-
lar, public opinion in the United Kingdom refused to accept new com-
pany structures which were considered to be typical for German Ak-
tiengesellschaften3' The dualistic system and employee participation
were regarded as strange institutions, not suitable for adaptation to
British labor relations.38
The Community-wide discussion on co-determination exposed the
proposal's insufficient consideration of different political, historical and
ideological traditions, social relations, and systems of relationships be-
tween undertakings and employees in the Member States. Countries
historically familiar with co-determination mechanisms were better
prepared to accept European participative proposals than countries are
where such mechanisms are unknown and where the social partners do
3 Id. at 9.
36 See, e.g., Constas, The Developing European Community Law of Worker Par-
ticipation in Management, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 93 (1978); Diubler, The
Employee Participation Directive -A Realistic Utopia?, 14 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
457, 459 (1977); Schmitthoff, Company Structure and Employee Participation in the
EEC - The British Attitude, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 611 (1976); Waschke, Workers'
Participation in Management in the Nine European Community Countries, 2 COMP.
LAB. L. 83 (1977).
"' See, e.g., Schmitthoff, supra note 36.
3' The widely differing opinions in the UK were reflected in the Report of the
Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy (Chairman Lord Bullock) which was
presented to Parliament in January 1977. INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 1977, CMND.
No. 6706. Even though this Report made recommendations for a British domestic solu-
tion, the employee participation proposals of the Commission became part of the de-
bate. For details, see W. KOLVENBACH & P. HANAU, "UNITED KINGDOM" HAND-
BOOK ON EUROPEAN EMPLOYEE CO-MANAGEMENT (1989).
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not believe in cooperation between management and labor.39
2.3.
Strong criticism was voiced in the EEC institutions and substantial
changes to the draft were demanded.
2.3.1.
In its report of February 2, 1978, the Economic and Social Com-
mittee ("ESC") adopted the opinion "that employee participation in
the broadest sense of the term is a desirable development in a demo-
cratic society," but that "the issue of participation should be treated in
a down-to-earth and practical fashion. . . . [T]he only conceivable
Community provisions on participation are flexible ones."4° The report
of the subcommittee shows the wide range of differing opinions existing
in the Member States. Specifically, British delegates pointed out that in
some Member States trade unions and employees are not willing to
accept co-responsibility.,
2.3.2.
The Legal Affairs Committee of the EP referred to the amended
Statute for European Companies, which proposes that one-third of the
supervisory board should be composed of representatives of the capital
owners, one-third should be representatives of the company's employ-
ees, and one-third should be persons elected by both groups. According
to the Legal Affairs Committee's first report, the co-option model "does
not constitute a form of genuine employee participation in the organs of
the company. There is no point in employees' representation in the or-
gans of the company unless the company employees are free to elect
th'eir candidates . . . [who enjoy] their confidence." '41 The first directly
11 See generally W. KOLVENBACH, COOPERATION BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND
LABOUR (1982).
'0 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 94) 1, 3 (1979). The difficulties of coordinating
employee participation structures in the Member States are vividly shown by the Re-
port of the ESC subcommittee on the Green Paper. The subcommittee notes that the
Green Paper was drafted in English and "[t]hat the original English text uses the term
'participation' as the general term for all types of participation by employees and trade
unions." In the German version, "participation" had originally been improperly trans-
lated as "Mitbestimmung." The narrow definition of that term, in English "co-deter-
mination," caused a certain amount of confusion. The confusion has since been quelled
by re-translating the term as "Mitwirkung," a broader term encompassing all forms of
employee involvement, including the narrower "Mitbestimmung." Id.
41 1979-1980 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM No. 136) 1, 30 (1979). The report was
[Vol. 11:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol11/iss4/1
EEC COMPANY LAW HARMONIZATION
elected EP appointed a new rapporteur, Aart Geurtsen. Mr. Geurtsen's
report recommended equality of the right to protect the interests of the
firms affected by the proposed directive.42 Only firms with at least
2,000 employees should fall under the new directive. All employees,
regardless of whether or not they are members of a trade union, shall
have a vote in the election of their representatives for the board. This
provoked strong opposition, especially in Great Britain.43
On January 15, 1982, the Legal Affairs Committee submitted its
second report." In the final vote on May 11, 1982, the proposed
changes were accepted by a vote of 159 to 109.45 Thus, after almost ten
years of parliamentary battles, the EP passed the Fifth Directive with
substantial changes to the first draft of the Commission. The proposal
that emerged from this parliamentary battle contained minimum re-
quirements of employee participation, with the possibility for govern-
ments of the Member States to take into account national traditions.
6
The trade union movement considered the changes demanded by
discussed in the EP, but no vote was taken. 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 140) 59
(1979). See generally Kolvenbach, Industrial Democracy: Legal Developments in Eu-
rope 1977-1979, 1 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 77, 127-28 (1980) (discussing
revisions and amendments regarding supervisory board election methods and the dual-
istic structure of the company).
42 Report of A. Geurtsen, PE 62.045 (May 7, 1979). See also Employee Partici-
pation: Draft Report to the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament,
EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., Apr. 1980, at 26.
'3 See Birds, The Law Society Takes a Position on Employee Participation, 2
COMPANY LAw. 73 (1980). The following publications convey this message: HUTCH-
INSON, THE EEC VTH DIRECTIVE - A TROJAN BULLOCK? (1980); The Institute of
Directors, Beware the Vth Directive, (Sept. 4, 1980) (conference documents). In an
August 5, 1980 letter to the author, Lord Bullock remarked: "You may perhaps have
seen that the Institute of Directors has published a report resisting the EEC Vth Direc-
tive. With characteristic managerial humour, they have entitled it 'A Trojan Bullock?'
Evidently, their classical learning is not very good, since the arrival of the Trojan horse
was the prelude to the fall of Troy." Letter from Lord Bullock to Professor Walter
Kolvenbach (Aug. 5, 1980) (discussing the European Community and the Fifth Direc-
tive). For further studies, see Horton, Current Developments in the Law of
Codetermination: Mannesmannn and Beyond, 16 TEX. INT'L L.J. 433 (1981); Hopt,
Grundprobleme der Mitbestimmung in Europa: Eine rechtsvergleichende Bestand-
saufnahme und Einschatzung der Vorschliige zur Rechtsangleichung der Arbei-
tnehmermitbestimmung in den Europiiischen Gemeinschaften, 13 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
ARBEITSRECHT [ZFA] 207 (1982); Hopt, Problemes Fondamentaux de la Participa-
tion en Europe, 34 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL ET DE DROIT
ECONOMIQUE [REV. TRIM. DR. COMM. & ECON.] 401 (1981); Kolvenbach, The
Evolving Concept of European Labor Relations Legislation, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 535, 546 (1981); HUTCHINSON & THOMAS, THE FIFTH DIRECTIVE AND THE
HARMONIZATION PROGRAMME (1982).
" 1981-1982 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM No. 1-852) 1 (1982).
4 25 O.J. EUR. COMm. (No. C 149) 20 (1982); Parliament's Opinion on the
Fifth Directive, EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., June 1982, at 10.
48 Janssen van Raay, The European Parliament and the Fifth Directive, 13
BULL. Comp. LAB. REL. 9 (1984).
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the EP to be not far-reaching enough, but in reply to the demand of the
EP, the Commission accepted most of the BP's suggestions in its an-
swer of September 16, 1982.4"
2.4.
The Commission amended the proposed Fifth Company Law Di-
rective at its meeting on July 28, 1983.48 The Commission stated that
the "further coordination of laws relating to public limited companies
has been given priority owing to their relative importance as regards
cross-frontier economic activities." 49 Two different arrangements of
company administration are presently practiced in the Community: (1)
one administrative organ, or (2) two organs, which are a management
organ responsible for managing company business and a supervisory
organ responsible for controlling the management body. The proposal
clearly favors the two-tier arrangement, but states that making this sys-
tem compulsory is impractical at the present time. The Commission
opines that provisions should be made for employee participation
within the supervisory or administrative organ in all Member States in
order to comply with the flexibility demanded by the ESC and the EP.
The operation of the Directive's provisions concerning organization and
employee participation should be reviewed within five years after these
provisions are first applied. This review should contemplate whether
further harmonization is desirable, "including the question of the desir-
ability of the general introduction of equal representation of sharehold-
ers and employees on the supervisory or administrative organ.""0
Consistent with the desired flexibility, Member States should prin-
cipally adopt the two-tier system (management organ and supervisory
organ) in their company laws. They may, however, permit a choice
between the two-tier system and a one-tier system (administrative
organ).
2.4.1.
For companies in the Community employing more than 1,000 em-
ployees either directly or in subsidiaries, Member States are required to
adopt one of four options regarding employee participation. However, a
" EEC Fifth Directive: European Commission Statement in Reply to the Opinion
of the European Parliament of 11 May 1982 on the Fifth Company Law Directive
(Geurtsen Report), EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., Nov. 1982, at 24.
11 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 240) 2 (1983).
49 Id. at 3.
50 Id. at 4.
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participation model does not have to be applied if a majority of the
employees vote against it. In countries with participation systems under
which employees appoint one-half of the members of the supervisory
organ, the voting procedures must assure that "decisions may ulti-
mately be taken by the members appointed by the general meeting,"
that is, by the shareholders' representatives.51 The four options give the
entire system a large degree of flexibility and enable Member States,
through their national legislation, to practice participative structures
which have historically grown and proven to be effective.
Under the first option, the general meeting appoints a maximum
of two-thirds of the members of the supervisory organ. The employees
appoint a minimum of one-third and a maximum of one-half of the
members of the supervisory board.
The second alternative is modelled along the Dutch cooptation sys-
tem. Members of the supervisory organ are coopted by that organ. The
general meeting or the representative of the employees may object to
the appointment of a candidate on the ground that either he lacks the
ability to carry out his duties or that his election would create an "im-
properly constituted" organ in view of the interests of the company, the
shareholders and the employees. On appeal, an independent body ex-
isting under public law can find the objection unfounded.
Under the third alternative, employee participation takes place
through a separate body representing company employees. This body
has the right to regularly receive information and consultation on the
company's administration, progress and prospects, competitive position,
credit situation and investment plans from the management organ. The
rights of this representative body are the same as the information rights
of the members of the supervisory organ appointed by the general as-
sembly. Further, this body must be consulted in the same way as the
supervisory organ and in all cases in which the supervisory organ con-
siders granting authorization for decisions of the management organ.
The employee body meets prior to each supervisory board meeting and
must be provided with all the documentation and information related to
the agenda of the supervisory board meeting.
The fourth alternative institutes employee participation through
collectively agreed upon systems. If collective agreements are not con-
cluded before a certain period of time, Member States must regulate
employee participation in accordance with one of the other options.
51 Id. at 8.
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2.4.2.
If the unitary organization continues to be practiced in a company,
the administrative organ must consist of executive members who man-
age the company and non-executive members who supervise executive
members. The number of non-executive members shall be greater than
the number of executive members and divisible by three. The non-exec-
utive members appoint the executive members of the administrative or-
gan by majority decision. In principle, the Commission has included in
its proposal for the one-tier system the same rules for employee partici-
pation as in the two-tier system.
In its opinion, the EP insisted on certain principles for the ap-
pointment or election of employee representatives in order to guarantee
the democratic character of employee participation systems. Under the
amended proposal, the Member States may prescribe specific rules irx
accordance with their national laws and practice, but, as a matter of
principle, the members of the supervisory organ and the representatives
of the employees must be elected in accordance with a proportional rep-
resentation to ensure the protection of minorities. All employees must
be able to participate in the election which shall be by secret ballot.
The free expression of opinion shall be guaranteed. 2
2.5.
The Commission hoped to overcome criticism by complying with
the demands of the EP and by offering a number of options for em-
ployee participative systems. Unfortunately, the criticism continues.
The trade unions are discontented because the amended draft is, in
their opinion, less stringent than the original proposal. The European
52 The regulations concerning the structure of the company and the powers and
obligations of its organs were also amended by the suggestions made by the EP. For
comments on the amended proposal see Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance:
European Experiments with Labor Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L.
REv. 1338 (1984); Kolvenbach, Die Filnfte EG-Richtlinie iber die Struktur der Ak-
tiengesellschaft (Strukturrichtlinie), 42 DER BETRIEB 2235 (1983); Pipkorn, Der Ein-
fluss der Europiischen Gemeinschaft auf das Unternehmens- und Betriebsverfassung-
srecht, 1985 INTEGRATIONSRECHT 33;, Pipkorn, Die Mitwirkungsrechte der
Arbeitnehmer aufgrund der Kommissionsvorschldge der Strukturrichtlinie und der
Richtlinie iber die Unterrichtung und Anhirung der Arbeitnehmer, 4 ZEITSCHRIT
FOR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 567 (1985); Timmermanns,
Die europaische Rechtsangleichung im Gesellschaftsrecht, Eine Integrations- und
Rechtspolitische Analyse, 48 RABELS ZEITSCHRiFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTER-
NATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 1 (1984); Welch, The Fifth Draft Directive - A
False Dawn?, 1983 EUR. LAB. REv. 83; Westermann, Tendenzen der gegenwirtigen
Mitbestimmungsdiskussion in der Europilischen Gemeinschaft, 48 RABELSZ 123
(1984).
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Trade Union Confederation ("ETUC"), in its position paper, criticized
the "reactionary nature of the amendments" and claim they have a neg-
ative attitude to genuine participation. 53 The German Trade Union
Organization described the amended draft as "an insult" to employees
and the co-determination rights for which they had fought.54 On the
management side of industry, the Union des Industries de la Com-
munautE Europ~enne ("UNICE") claims that the Directive wants to
establish co-determination systems in countries without a history of em-
ployee participation. UNICE opposes employee participation in com-
pany organs, and claims that the different systems are not suitable for
harmonization. Furthermore, the number of companies with transna-
tional operations affected by non-harmonized worker participative in-
stitutions is small. The proposed regulation is incompatible with the
traditions and practices of industrial relations in some Member States,
especially those which have yet to pass legislation in this area.55
The Trades Union Congress ("TUC") claims that trade unions
should be concerned with the general issues raised in the Fifth Direc-
tive. "In view of the ten year delay in tackling this important area the
General Council (of TUC) notes with great concern the indication in
the governmental document that a further lengthy delay is envisaged by
government. '56 TUC believes that the government's comments on the
drafts are of a "highly prejudicial nature."5 But it is also of the opin-
ion that the Fifth Directive "reflects a naive view of the nature of rep-
resentative democracy in collectively representative structures." 58
Opposition is especially strong in the United Kingdom.5" In No-
53 European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC Position on the Amended Pro-
posal for a Fifth Directive (1984) (adopted by the ETUC Executive Committee at its
session in Brussels on Feb. 9-10, 1984).
"' Press release of Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (Nov. 28, 1983).
56 Union des Industries de ]a Communaut6 Europ~enne, UNICE Position on Em-
ployee Participation and the Structure of the Organs of Public Limited Companies
(Feb. 28, 1984) (addressed to the European Commission and the Council of Ministers).
" Trades Union Congress, The Vredeling proposals and the Fifth Directive:
Government Consultant Document (Dec. 12, 1983). See also The Participation Debate
Continued, 123 EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., June 1984, at 16.
57 Id.
68 Id.
9 The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) opposes both the draft Vredeling
Directive and the Fifth Directive. It considers both drafts not only unnecessary but,
if implemented, irrelevant to the needs of industry; counter-productive to
the achievement of widespread and genuine employee involvement; damag-
ing to competitiveness and largely impractical .... Genuine and effective
employee involvement, benefitting both companies and their employees,
can be developed only on a voluntary basis. It is only in this way that the
particular need and circumstances of individual companies, the sectors of
industry in which they operate, and the existing national framework of
labor relations law and practice can be taken into account.
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vember 1983, the British Departments of Employment and of Trade
and Industry published a consultative document on the "Draft Euro-
pean Communities Fifth Directive on the Harmonization of Company
Law" (and on the directive on procedures for informing and consulting
employees).6 ° The British Government states:
It has already made clear its profound reservations on these
proposals. Whilst it is firmly committed to the principle of
managements informing and consulting employees about
matters which affect them and has consistently urged organi-
zations to develop procedures which are appropriate to their
particular circumstances, it believes that successful employee
involvement depends as much on a spirit of co-operation as
on the existence of formal machinery, and that it is best in-
troduced voluntarily. [The British Government] believes that
the introduction of community-wide legislation in this area
would contribute nothing to the establishment of a common
market in goods and services, but would increase employer's
costs and damage the competitive position of industry in the
Community. Nevertheless, in order to insure that the views
of U.K. interests are fully represented during the negotia-
tions in Brussels . . . the government would welcome the
views of all interested organizations and individuals on the
revised text."'
The Law Society discusses legal problems which may arise if the
United Kingdom adopts company law principles as well as the em-
ployee participation systems in the Fifth Directive. The political ac-
ceptance of these principles necessitates extensive changes and amend-
ments to the existing body of legislation. 2 More than 100 organizations
and individuals responded to the United Kingdom government's con-
sultative document, and almost all criticized the draft directives.6"
Confederation of British Industry, CBI Response to the Government's Consultative
Document on Draft EEC Directive on Procedure for Informing and Consulting Em-
ployees (The "Vredeling" Directive) and Draft EEC Directive on the Harmonization
of Company Law (Feb. 1984) [hereinafter CBI Response]. See also The Participation
Debate Continued, supra note 56.
60 British Departments of Employment and of Trade and Industry, Draft Euro-
pean Communities Directive on Procedures for Informing and Consulting Employees -
Draft European Communities Fifth Directive on the Harmonization of Company Law
(Nov. 9, 1983) (joint press notice, consultative document) [hereinafter British
Departments].
1 Id.
62 The Law Society's Standing Committee on Company Law, Memorandum on
the Fifth Directive (Mar. 1984).
63 The Participation Debate Continued, supra note 56.
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The Federal Republic of Germany also expressed concern over the
effect of the Fifth Directive. Its general concern is whether the special
co-determination regime for the coal and steel industry in the Federal
Republic could still be practiced under the Fifth Directive. Despite re-
peated assurances that the revised draft permits the continuation of the
coal and steel co-determination model, the German Minister for Labor
officially criticized the Fifth Directive and described it as "token-har-
monization. ' The uneasiness is, to a certain extent, a result of the
political problems that implementing the necessary changes to existing
German co-determination legislation would create. 5
2.6.
The EP has repeatedly asked the Commission for a report on the
progress of the Council's discussions on the proposed Fifth Directive.6
One of the EP's questions was motivated by a Commission representa-
tive's statement at a meeting of the Committee on Social Affairs: "(a)
that, as regards worker participation and workers' rights, it was neces-
sary in practice to take account of the Council's negative attitude and
that proposals in this area were therefore inopportune, and (b) that the
Single Act excluded the matter of workers' rights and worker participa-
tion. 16 7 The Commission's answer emphasized that the Single Euro-
pean Act, particularly as a result of the new Articles 118 A and 118 B,
has given a new impetus to Community initiatives in social policy:68
Relating more particularly to the rights and interests of
workers, although they are excluded from the field of appli-
cation of the new Article 100 A of the Treaty nevertheless
they can be the subject of measures covered by other provi-
sions of the Treaty and the Commission will not fail to adopt
the appropriate initiatives with a view to protecting them
when the time is ripe.6"
64 Handelsblatt, June 24, 1989, at 9.
65 Kolvenbach, Die Europdische Gemeinschaft und die deutsche Mitbestimmung,
38 DER BETRIEB 1973 (1986).
16 28 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. C 39) 9 (1985); 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 244)
42 (1988).
11 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 93) 33 (1988).
68 Id.
"I Id. Articles 118a and 118b supplement the Treaty and deal with improvements
in the working environment. Under the new system the Council has the power to act by
a qualified majority:
Article 11 8a
1. Member States shall pay particular attention to encouraging improve-
ments, especially in the working environment, as regards the health and
safety of workers, and shall set as their objective the harmonization of
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The Commission, in its Memorandum on the Statute for the Eu-
ropean Company to the EP, the Council, and the two sides of industry,
mentions that the proposed Fifth Directive is currently in its second
reading in the Council.7 °
With regard to the questions of "structure" it would seem
the groundwork for a decision at a political level is by and
large done; on the worker participation provisions we are far
less advanced, despite progress in this context since 1972 at
condition in this area, while maintaining the improvements made.
2. In order to help achieve the objective laid down in the first paragraph,
the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Com-
mission, in co-operation with the European Parliament and after consult-
ing the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt, by means of direc-
tives, minimum requirements for gradual implementation, having regard
to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each of the Member
States.
Such directives shall avoid imposing administrative, financial and legal
constraints in a way which would hold back the creation and development
of small and medium-sized undertakings.
3. The provisions adopted pursuant to this Article shall not prevent any
Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent measures
for the protection of working conditions compatible with this Treaty....
Article 118b
The Commission shall endeavour to develop the dialogue between man-
agement and labour at European level which could, if the two sides con-
sider it desirable, lead to relations based on agreement.
30 O.J. EUR. COM. (No. L 169) 1, 9 (1987).
Article 100a excludes from qualified majority decisions of the Council provisions
"relating to the rights and interests of employed persons." Id. at 8.
Article 100a
1. By way of derogation from Article 100 and save where otherwise pro-
vided in this Treaty, the following provisions shall apply for the achieve-
ment of the objectives set out in Article 8a. The Council shall, acting by a
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission in co-operation
with the European Parliament and after consulting the Economic and So-
cial Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the provi-
sions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member
States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the
internal market.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those relating to the
free movement of persons nor to those relating to the rights and interests
of employed persons.
Id.
70 The complicated and time consuming procedure in the Council which normally
is not publically known has been described by Woodland, Le Processus Lgislatif dans
la CommunautO Economique Europ~enne (Aspects de Droit des Socits), 28 REVUE
DU MARCHt COMMUN [REV. MARCHL CoM.] 503, 511 (1985). "L'harmonisation du
droit des socit~s, a fortiori t'adoption de r~gles uniformes, suppose de payer le prix du
compromis et de prendre quelque libert6 avec un rigorisme juridique et une concision
rdactionelle qui se concoivent mieux dans l'environnement dtermin6 du droit na-
tional, bien que les legislations contemporaines n'en fournissent gu~re ]a d~monstra-
tion." Id.
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the national level and despite the more flexible approach to
this topic in the amended proposal. It will probably not be
until the end of the third reading, within two to three years,
before adoption at political level of the complete Fifth Direc-
tive could be finally assessed.7"
The Commission realizes that:
[Slow progress is] the result of a long-standing difficulty
which stems from differences in traditions regarding partici-
pation by workers in company-decision-making: according to
some, any such participation must be voluntary, while for
others it must be written in statutory law relating to enter-
prises. Nevertheless, no satisfactory compromise has yet been
found which would bridge the gap between the two basic
attitudes . . . . The difficulty of moving forward on the fun-
damental issue of worker participation is a perennial prob-
lem in the harmonization of company law, and a bone of
contention in the social dialogue. A break-through in this
area now seems to be essential in the social dialogue; other-
wise vital elements in the construction of a single market
may remain blocked for a long time.
72
In proposals for other company law directives, the Commission
has referred to the draft Fifth Directive whenever employee participa-
tion had to be mentioned. Examples include the proposal for a Ninth
Directive on groups of companies73 and the proposal for a Tenth Di-
rective on transborder mergers. 74 The Fifth Directive is also referred to
in the European Economic Interest Grouping75 and the Statute for a
European Company.
76
3. THE PROPOSAL FOR A NINTH EEC COMPANY LAW DIRECTIVE:
LINKS BETWEEN UNDERTAKINGS AND IN PARTICULAR GROUPS
3.1.
In its White Paper of June 14, 1985, the Commission mentioned
71 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, MEMORANDUM ON THE
STATUTE FOR THE EUROPEAN COMPANY (1989).
72 Id.
71 See infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
7" 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 23) 11 (1985). See also infra notes 92-108 and
accompanying text.
71 See infra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
76 See infra notes 192-262 and accompanying text.
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the necessity for a Directive on the relationship of undertakings in a
group.71 Although a proposal was to be announced in 1988 and to be
adopted in 1990, neither has occurred. The Ninth Directive intends to
harmonize the law of the Member States with respect to such issues as
parent company responsibility, rights of minority shareholders, safe-
guards for creditors of subsidiary companies, and rights of employees
within a group. Other important matters also will be included .7 The
first ideas for the directive received little support and various provisions
drew vehement opposition.
Especially criticized was the envisaged far-reaching personal lia-
bility of the parent's Board of Directors for management actions that
inure to the detriment of the subsidiary. Liability is not conditioned on
noncompliance with recognized standards of prudence and business
judgment. Also criticized were the requirement of public notice when-
ever blocks of shares in companies are acquired by other enterprises
and the requirement of periodic reports detailing all activities under-
taken by a subsidiary for the benefit of the parent. It was claimed that
the Ninth Directive was aimed at the decentralization of corporate
management.7 ' The first draft was considered to be inconsistent with
the obligation of the board of directors to defend the interests of its
company or group of companies.
3.2.
The preliminary draft of the proposed directive, which the Com-
mission sent to the Member States of the Community in 1984, has been
the subject of great criticism, especially in the United Kingdom. Even
its basic approach towards the regulation of groups of companies was
questioned.
The concept of regulating companies is foreign to most Member
States, and some countries emphasize that only the Federal Republic of
Germany and Portugal have a Konzernrecht. 0 Therefore, the pro-
testing States claim, there is no need for harmonization, since the other
Member States do not have similar company law regulations.
It was critically noted that the draft of the Ninth Directive pre-
" See WHITE PAPER, supra note 24.
78 Nieuwdorp, Status Report on EEC Company Law Harmonisation, 12 INT'L
Bus. LAW. 425, 430 (1984).
71 Schneebaum, The Company Law Harmonization Program of the European
Community, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 293, 319 (1982). But cf Derom, The EEC
Approach to Groups of Companies, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 565 (1976) (supporting EEC
comprehensive legislation concerning company groups).
1o A comprehensive set of regulations governing company groups integrated in the
1965 West German corporate law. Aktiengesetz, 1965 BGB1 11 1089.
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supposes that the Fifth Directive will pass into law. The draft proposal
describes management structures which are consistent with the require-
ments of the Fifth Directive. The preamble to the draft refers to the
workers' right to participate in the decision-making process, and it is
stated that these rights are not to be reduced as a result of a company's
incorporation into a group of companies. In the United Kingdom,
strong voices suggest that the Ninth Directive should not be used to
introduce the Fifth Directive "through the backdoor." The United
Kingdom Government is of the opinion that there is no need for such a
directive. Other countries have been reluctant to comment.8 '
3.3.
The Commission's "Proposal for a Ninth Directive pursuant to
Article 54.3(g) of the EEC Treaty relating to links between undertak-
ings, and in particular groups"'8 2 refers in a number of clauses to co-
determination rights of employees. The authors of the draft are of the
following opinion:
[Many companies] have links which make them interdepen-
dent with other enterprises and are no longer economically
independent entities. Incorporation into a group constitutes a
particularly advanced form of this interdependence. It is
characterized by the fact that the undertakings concerned re-
tains its individual legal form, but loses its economic inde-
pendence. Undertakings which are members of groups play a
significant role in many economic sectors whether they con-
cern industry, commerce or the provision of services. They
employ a significant part of the working population and play
a major role on the capital market.
8 3
The draft points out that multinational undertakings have, legally
speaking, a group structure and that their economic importance gives
them a leading position in this context. The proposal states that a spe-
cial solution is required in the context of groups, especially with respect
to employee information, consultation and participation. "This is be-
cause existing rights may become meaningless and ineffective if, within
a group, employees are not also informed, consultated and represented
s Nieuwdorp, EEC Company Law Harmonisation, 15 INT'L Bus. LAW. 177,
179 (1987).
"2 III/1639/84-EN (internal Commission Number) [hereinafter Proposed Ninth
Directive]. This proposal is published in German at 3 ZGR 444 (1985).
"3 Proposed Ninth Directive, supra note 82.
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where group policy is made." 4 These concerns are addressed in the
amended proposal for a Directive on the Information and Consultation
of Employees (Vredeling Proposal). 5 This directive "will ensure proce-
dures for informing and consulting the employees of undertakings."8
The author of the draft could not have envisaged that this proposal
would not yet be passed in 1989 nor that it is unlikely to be passed in
the near future.
3.4.
The proposal continues: "as regards employees, there must be a
guaranty in their favor that their rights to participate in the decision-
making process of a public limited liability company are not endan-
gered as a result of its incorporation in a group."8" Article 2(a) refers
to the amended proposal for a Fifth Directive and explains that this
amended proposal provides:
that public limited liability companies may be organized not
only on the dualistic structure (a management body and a
supervisory body) originally envisaged, but also on a monist
structure (a single body, the administrative body), the opera-
tion of which has been conceived as closely analoguous to
that of the dualistic system. In these circumstances, it was
not thought appropriate to encumber the text of the present
directive with constant references to the two alternatives. Ar-
ticle 2(a) makes, once and for all, the necessary adjustment
of terminology."8 8
According to the proposal's introduction:
[E]mployee participation at group level at present forms the
subject of transitional provisions in the amended proposal for
a directive on the structure of public limited liability compa-
nies, pending a subsequent coordination. The present propo-
sal for a directive does not and will not seek to deal with
these problems. Whilst it does contain a safeguard clause on
one limited point, this is to ensure that the rules already in
force in certain Member States are not evaded before appro-
84 Id.
8 Vredeling Proposal, supra note 5. See also Employee Information and Consul-
tation Procedures, supra note 5.
88 Vredeling Proposal, supra note 5. See also Employee Information and Consul-
tation Procedures, supra note 5.
87 Proposed Ninth Directive, supra note 82.
88 Id.
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priate measures have been adopted at Community level.89
Article 7 of the proposal requires the management body of a sub-
sidiary to prepare a special report every year.9" This special report
shall give information which makes it possible to assess the extent and
intensity of the relationship between the subsidiary and the parent.
Agreements or measures which are wholly or partly detrimental to the
company, involve a particular risk for the company, or differ substan-
tially in extent and subject matter from the business which the com-
pany normally transacts, shall be individually specified in this special
report. The report shall also specify the actual or foreseeable effect of
such agreements or measures on the company's employees. The audi-
tors of the company must certify the accuracy of the details contained in
the special report. On application by a shareholder, creditor, or "com-
petent employees' representatives within the company," a court or an
authority competent under national law may appoint one or more spe-
cial auditors to examine the special report. The company, any share-
holder acting on its behalf, or a competent employees' representative
within the company acting on its behalf may file a claim for the dam-
ages resulting from interference of the parent undertaking.
The phrase "competent employees' representatives within the com-
pany" is interpretable under existing German co-determination legisla-
tion. The works council or the elected representatives in the supervisory
board satisfy the definition. However, under German law, the works
council does not have the right to interfere with the legal situation of
the enterprise. Also, the employee members of the supervisory board
are part of a company organ which does not enjoy any special rights.
Therefore, it is understandable that German authorities have been very
careful to comment on the proposed draft for the Ninth Directive.
Article 24 of the proposal also refers to employee participation in
company decision-making. The interests of the employees of a company
which receives instructions from the dominant undertaking are referred
to in Article 24. The special rights created by the proposal are unac-
ceptable in countries where the company laws define the rights granted
to employee representatives in company organs. German company law
contains explicit rules for groups of companies and protects outside
shareholders and creditors of a dependent company, but does not pro-
tect the company itself, or its employees. Furthermore, employee partic-
ipation rights are regulated in the co-determination laws of the Federal
89 Id.
90 Id.
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Republic of Germany. 1
Many technical regulations of the draft are also opposed by Mem-
ber States that do not have special legislation for groups of companies.
Therefore, it is not certain whether the Commission will be successful
in getting the Ninth Directive passed within the period mentioned in
the White Paper.
4. THE PROPOSAL FOR A TENTH EEC COMPANY LAW
DIRECTIVE: CROSS-BORDER MERGERS
The Commission presented its "Proposal for a tenth Council Directive
based on Article 54.3(g) of the EEC Treaty concerning cross-border
mergers of public limited companies" 92 on January 14, 1985. This pro-
posal ended an academic discussion that had begun in 1965. In its ex-
planatory memorandum, the Commission considered it important that
Community undertakings "have at their disposal the instruments which
would enable them to adapt their legal status to the dimension of the
Community and to achieve cross-border mergers of public limited com-
panies within the Community.19 3 Cross-border merger is, above all, a
technique to simplify the procedures for creating or restructuring com-
plex economic entities.
4.1.
In 1965, a working group chaired by Professor Goldman started
work on a draft convention to facilitate mergers between companies
subject to different national laws. The working group completed the
first stage of its activities in 1972 and presented a report on the Draft
Convention on International Mergers in 1973.94 After the accession of
the three new Member States, work resumed to adjust the draft to the
laws of the new members and to attempt to overcome problems not
solved by the working groups. Work on the draft Convention stopped
91 Hommelhoff, Zum revidierten Vorschlag fir eine EG-Konzernrichtlinie, in
FESTSCHRIFT FUR HANS-JOACHIM FLECK 125 (ZGR Sonderheft 7, 1988). Wienke,
Mitbestimmung und Konzernrecht, 1985 DER ARBEITGEBER 888; Wiesner, Konzer-
nrecht im Werden, 1985 DER ARBEITGEBER 884.
92 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 23) 11 (1985); Proposal for a Tenth Directive,
supra note 17.
93 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 23) 11 (1985); Proposal for a Tenth Directive,
supra note 17, at 5.
14 Draft Convention on the international merger of socitis anonymes and Re-
port on the draft, 6 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 1 (Supp. No. 13, 1973); Goldman, Le
Projet de Convention entre les Etats Membres de la Communaute Economique
Europeenne sur la Reconnaissance Mutuelle des Societes et Personnes Morales, 31
RABELSZ 201 (1967).
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again in 1980.
There were two reasons for the slow progress and eventual stand-
still of the work. First, tax arrangements for international mergers
were problematic; it would be pointless to make international mergers
legally possible unless fiscal barriers were abolished. Progress of the
group's work, therefore, depended on the progress of the directive on
tax arrangements for mergers (which also eventually came to a stand-
still). Second, the role of employee representatives in a company's deci-
sion-making bodies caused controversy. Member States with special le-
gal provisions for employee representation expressed concern that
international mergers could be used to avoid such representation.
4.2.
The original draft of the Convention was based on Article 220,
paragraph 3, which states:
Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into
negotiations with each other with the view to securing for
the benefit of their nationals:
... . the mutual recognition of companies or firms within
the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58, the re-
tention of legal personality in the event of transfer of their
seat from one country to another, and the possibility of
mergers between the companies or firms governed by the
laws of different countries. . .. "
In 1984, however, new efforts to find a solution for cross-border merg-
ers concentrated on the Third Directive, which was adopted on October
95 Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, at 87; Encyclopedia of EC Law, supra note 1,
at B10170/8. Authors in German publications have pondered whether using Article
54.3(g), instead of using Article 220 which necessitates a convention, would simplify
the process of negotiating a solution. See Bdrmann, Europaische Fusion, in BEITRAGE
ZUM WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT FESTSCHRIFT FOR KAUFMANN 13 (1972); Beitzke, Interna-
tionalrechtliches zur Gesellschaftsfusion, in PROBLEME DES EUROP.ISCHEN RECHTS
FESTSCHRIF-r FOR HALLSTEIN 14 (1966); Beitzke, Anerkennung und Sitzverlegung
von Gesellsehaften und juristischen Personen im EWG-Bereich, 127 ZHR 1 (1964);
Colloque organisg par le Centre Universitaire d'Etudes des Communaut~s Europ~en-
nes de la Facultb de Droit et de Sciences economiques de Paris, October 26-28, 1967,
109 REv. MARCH9 COM. (1968); Helbrich, Zur rechtlichen Problematik grenziiber-
schreitender Unternehmensfusionen, 1 OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR WIRT-
SCHAFTSRECHT 65 (1974); Lutter, supra note 30; Mertens, Angleichung des Gesell-
schaftsrechts, europdische Handelsgesellschaft .und europflischer Konzern, 1970
JURISTISCHE RUNDSCHAU 321; Ommeslaghe, Unternehmenskonzentration und Recht-
sangleichung in der EWG, 132 ZHR 201 (1969); Buchholz, Die Harmonisierung des
Gesellschaftsrechts nach dem EWG-Vertrag unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung des
Article 54.3(g) (1966) (unpublished dissertation).
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9, 1978.96 This Directive, based on Article 5 4 .3(g) of the Treaty, deals
with mergers between two companies which are both subject to the
laws of the same Member State. The Commission concluded that a
convention would have disadvantages which a directive would not have:
the text of a convention would have to be more complex to be self-
sufficient, national parliaments would have to ratify the convention,
and a convention would have to be re-negotiated every time a new
Member State joined the Community. Therefore, it seemed more ad-
vantageous to propose a directive based on Article 5 4.3(g).9" Further-
more, international mergers .could, in certain instances, be covered by
the rules of the Third Directive; only specific rules taking account of
the international nature of the merger would be necessary. Since most
of the Member States approved the Commission's new approach, the
directive seems to be the most suitable instrument for international
mergers.
4.3.
Work on the Draft Tenth Directive was bolstered by progress
made on the tax aspects of international mergers. A compromise on the
problem of employee representation made a break-through in tax mat-
ters possible. This compromise combined taxation and company law. It
permitted Member States to decide not to apply tax arrangements
favoring an international merger if, as a result of the merger, a firm,
even if it is not directly involved in the operation itself, would no longer
meet the conditions required for employee representation in its deci-
sion-making bodies. The proposal for the directive is complemented by
a fiscal regulation which is part of a package of three fiscal directives.98
On January 8, 1985, the Commission presented the proposal for a
Tenth Directive of the Council based on Article 54 .3 (g) of the Treaty
concerning cross-border mergers of public limited companies.99 The le-
gal machinery of the Tenth Directive for mergers between companies
meets two main objectives: (1) cooperation between firms should be
98 21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 295) 36 (1978); Proposal for a Tenth Directive,
supra note 17, at 16.
9 Koppensteiner, Grundlagenkritische Bemerkungen zum EWG-Entwurf eines
Ubereinkommens fiber die internationale Verschmelzung von Aktiengesellschaften, 39
RABELsZ 405 (1975); Pipkorn, supra note 30; Schwartz, Wege zur..EG-Rechtsver-
einheitlichung: Verordnungen der Europdischen Gemeinschaft oder ubereinkommen
unter den Mitgliedstaaten?, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERNST VON CAEMMERER 1067 (H.
Fickes ed. 1978); Timmermanns, supra note 52.
11 Proposal for a Tenth Directive, supra note 17, at 5 n.3.
"1 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 23) 11 (1985); Proposal for a Tenth Directive,
supra note 17, at 1.
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possible to the fullest extent, particularly in order to adapt their size to
that of the market in which they operate; and (2) to simplify proce-
dures for restructuring a group. Mergers thus provide a legal tool nec-
essary for a durable and homogeneous community market.
A prerequisite for cross-border mergers is that such mergers be
legally possible. At the present time, legislation in some Community
countries does not provide for mergers. In others, such operations are
subject to prohibitive conditions. Therefore, Community undertakings
wishing to merge have to resort to complex techniques. Even then,
however, the result is by no means identical to that of a merger because
the original companies normally retain their separate legal existence.
Referring to the tax compromise regarding employee representa-
tion in an undertaking, the Commission states:
In the tax Directive a solution was found based on the idea a
Member State might subject an international merger to cer-
tain conditions if one of the effects would be to put an end to
employee representation in an undertaking, particularly one
being required.
Given the priority accorded to solving the problems of
international mergers, this solution could also be temporarily
accepted in the company law field pending subsequent coor-
dination to be achieved by the proposed fifth Directive on the
structure of public limited companies and the powers and
obligations of their organs. This provides different but
equivalent employee representation systems and thus facili-
tates the complete solution of the problems related to inter-
national mergers.' 0
Therefore, Article 1.3 of the draft has been worded: "Pending subse-
quent coordination, a Member State need not apply the provisions of
this Directive to a cross-border merger where an undertaking, whether
or not it was involved, would as a result no longer meet the conditions
required for employee representation in that undertaking's organs."''
This possible exemption is, however, temporary and will disappear
when a uniform system is instituted.'0 2
110 Proposal for a Tenth Directive, supra note 17, at 6 (footnote omitted).
101 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 23), at 12; Proposal for a Tenth Directive,
supra note 17, at 12.
102 Joachim Ganske, a German government official involved in negotiating the
Tenth Directive, predicted in 1985 that the Commission's time limits for the Tenth
Directive might not be realistic. Ganske, Internationale Fusion von Gesellschaften in
der Europiiischen Gemeinschaft - ein neuer Ansatz. Zum Vorschlag der EG- Kommis-
sionflir eine Zehnte Richtlinie, 11 DER BETRIEB 581 (1985). Although both European
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4.4.
Since harmonization has already been achieved in the field of na-
tional mergers, the new directive is limited to matters specific to cross-
border mergers. All mergers, both national and cross-border, involve
the same steps. The special aspect of cross-border mergers is that the
merging companies are governed by the laws of different Member
States. All preparatory acts are carried out individually by each of the
companies involved in a cross-border merger in accordance with the
law of its own Member State, without any need for uniform rules. It is
necessary, however, to synchronize certain steps in the procedures, and
certain rules relating to cross-borders must be harmonized more exten-
sively than is necessary for national mergers. Especially important are
the contents of the draft terms of the merger, the protection of creditors
of acquired companies, the date on which the merger takes effect, and
the clauses of nullity of mergers.
4.4.1.
UNICE informed the Commission in a memorandum of July 18,
1985,"03 that European industry is in favor of a Community instrument
allowing cross-border mergers. It considers a Directive "the most ap-
propriate instrument to achieve this aim as it lends itself more easily to
harmonization than a convention, which is a cumbersome
instrument."104
UNICE's basic objection is to the proposal concerning employee
participation: "Art. i(3) would enable a Member State to exclude from
the scope of the directive any merger that threatens existing rights to
employee participation."' 0 5 This provision would fundamentally detract
from the stated goal of the Commission's proposal, which is the harmo-
employers' organizations and trade unions in the ESC in February 1989 favored the
Community's action to guarantee basic rights and to protect workers in cross-border
mergers, the problem is still unsolved and, apparently, will not be solved in the near
future. See Brussels Claims Wide Support over Workers' Rights, Financial Times
(London), Feb. 24, 1989, at 2. Additionally, the German Bundesrat instructed the Ger-
man Government to demand, during Council deliberations on the proposal, additional
safeguards for the co-determination rights that exist in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. In view of the uncertainty of the Fifth Directive, it must be assumed that Article
1(3) of the proposal remains effective for an indefinite period of time. Under these
circumstances, Article 1(3) cannot be reconciled with the harmonization directive and,
therefore, serious objections must be raised, Decision of Deutscher Bundesrat 56/85
(Mar. 14, 1986).
103 Union des Industries de la Communaut6 Europeenne, UNICE Position Mem-
orandum 22.6/7/1 (July 18, 1985) (internal document).
104 Id.
105 Id.
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nization of legislative arrangements throughout the EEC. The draft ar-
ticle would cause confusion, uncertainty and delay for companies in-
volved in cross-border mergers.
UNICE has several objections to the substance of Article 1(3).
The provisions allow Member States, for a period whose end is not yet
in sight, to prevent firms from being taken over in cross-border merg-
ers. As a result, firms will be branded and the possibility of resorting to
availabile legal instruments when restructuring will be severely limited.
Article 1(3) gives legal standing to arrangements for employee partici-
pation in company organs even if these arrangements do not exist
under national law. Under national law, a firm can be changed into a
legal entity not subject to employee participation requirements. UNICE
refers to the "German Limited Company" (Gesellschaft mit
beschrankter Haftung) which is subject to employee participative sys-
tems and which can become a general partnership (Offene Handel-
sgesellschaft) not subject to employee participation systems. This exam-
ple shows that, at a national level, employee participation provisions do
not prevent a change in structure that effectively removes the require-
ment for employee participation.
Another objection is that a directive including Article 1(3) would
create an imbalance between Member States. UNICE states:
In fact, in Member States where employe participation in
company organs is not provided for, firms could proceed
with these mergers in which they could be either the acquir-
ing company or the one absorbed. On the other hand, in
Member States that can apply the reservation provided for in
Article 1(3), firms established there could not be acquired by
other firms. This imbalance poses a serious problem with
regard to industrial policy, which must ensure that opera-
tions can work both ways.
106
Additionally, UNICE comments that the company law directive
must be accompanied by a fiscal directive because the tax burden on
mergers could be so heavy that a directive providing for cross-border
mergers would remain impractical. Once its recommendation regarding
Article 1(3) has been met satisfactorily, UNICE will examine the vari.
ous technical provisions of the proposed directive in a constructive
spirit.
106 Id.
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4.5.
On September 26, 1985, the European Social Committee ("ESC")
adopted its opinion on the Draft Tenth Directive.1 " The opinion,
passed as a compromise between the groups represented in the ESC,
suggests a number of revisions to the text regarding worker participa-
tion and consumer protection. Most of the proposed revisions concern
employee representation, and the supporting arguments are similar to
the comments made by UNICE. The ESC opinion suggests research in
order to determine whether there is a strong demand for cross-border
mergers. Experiences with national mergers should be examined and
the consequences of such mergers for employees studied. The opinion
emphasizes that the Tenth Directive is not adequate to solve the
problems raised in the Fifth Directive. Therefore, it is necessary to re-
draft the Tenth Directive.
4.6.
The EP rejected the proposal and referred it back to the Commis-
sion for further deliberation. 8 It believed that Community rights for
worker involvement in company decision-making had to be guaranteed
before cross-border merger rules can be adopted. Therefore, the Fifth
Company Law Directive seemed to be more urgent than the Tenth
Directive.
5. THE PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE ON PROCEDURES FOR
INFORMING AND CONSULTING EMPLOYEES
Strictly interpreted, the Vredling proposal does not belong to the
company law directives. It has to be included in a survey of the harmo-
nization program of the Commission, however, because it is referred to
in other draft directives as an important complement to the entire pack-
age. The proposal to improve and coordinate the information and con-
sultation procedures for employees has to be seen in connection with
two principal objectives of the Commission.
5.1.
On January 21, 1974, the Council passed a resolution on a Social
107 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 303) 27 (1985); Commission Proposes Tenth
Directive, EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., Mar. 1985, at 2.
1o8 1987-1988 EUR. PARL. REP. (No. A 2-186/87) 1 (Oct. 28, 1987); ECStalls
on Cross-Border Mergers, INT'L Accr. BULL., Nov. 1987, at 3.
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Action Program presented by the Commission on October 25, 1973.1"9
The Council gave priority to "[t]he progressive involvement of workers
or their representatives in the life of undertakings in the Commu-
nity."' G In the sixties, the social policy activities of the Community had
been overshadowed by the efforts made to establish a free flow of goods.
In the early seventies, it was realized that the tremendous economic
growth of the postwar period had to be supplemented by far-reaching
social reforms."' Economic integration had to be made attractive to the
working population through social integration "to attain . ..full and
better employment at Community, national and regional levels, which
is an essential condition for an effective social policy.""' 2
5.2.
On November 7, 1973, the Commission sent a Communication to
the Council on the situation of multinational undertakings in the Com-
munity." 3 In its Communication, "Multinational Undertakings and
Community Regulations," the Commission pointed out that:
the growing hold of multinational undertakings on the eco-
nomic, social and even political life of the countries in which
they operate, gives rise to deep anxieties which are suffi-
ciently divided, particularly in the areas of employment,
competition, tax avoidance, disturbing capital movements
and the economic independence of developing countries to
demand the attention of the public authorities."'
The Commission attributed this development to the size and geographic
spread of multinational undertakings and claimed that the "effective-
ness of the traditional measures of the public authorities and trade un-
ions""' 5 was in doubt because national legal, fiscal, economic and mon-
10 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 13) 1 (1974); Social Action Programme, 7 BULL.
EUR. COMMUNITIES 1 (Supp. No. 2, 1974).
I'l 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 13) 4 (1974); Social Action Programme, supra
note 109, at 10.
"I B. BEUTLER, R. BIEBER, J. PIPKORN & J. STREIL, DIE EUROPXISCHE
GEMEINSCHAFT: RECHTSORDNUNG UND POLITIK 439 (3d ed. 1987).
1 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 13) 1-2 (1974); Social Action Programme, supra
note 109, at 7.
113 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, MULTINATIONAL UNDER-
TAKINGS AND COMMUNITY REGULATIONS, COM No. 1930 (Nov. 7, 1973). See also
Multinational Undertakings and the Community, 6 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 1
(Supp. No. 15, 1973) (Council Response).
114 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 113. See also
Multinational Undertakings and the Community, supra note 113, at 7.
"1' COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 113. See also
Multinational Undertakings and the Community, supra note 113, at 7.
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etary rules were inadequate to address the problems.
It is necessary, therefore, to introduce suitable counterweights at
the Community and international level.
[T]he Commission is aware of the legal problem raised by
the need for appropriate representation of employees' inter-
ests vis-A-vis a company which no longer takes its decisions
independently but complies with those of the group of which
it forms [a] part. In the course of the coordination of the law
on groups of companies which it is at present undertaking,
the Commission will examine the question as to what mea-
sures will have to be adopted in this field.
The provision of information for, and the participation
of employees in cases where either the parent company or
any of the member undertakings of the group are situated
outside the Community raise substantial problems to which
the Commission's departments are seeking adequate
solutions." 6
This declaration of the Commission has to be seen in the context
of the worldwide discussion regarding the role of multinational corpo-
rations ("MNCs") in the world economy. Effective control of trans-
border activities and the ensuing legal problems led to the attempt to
subject MNC's to international control by creating codes of conduct for
MN C's. 17
All codes of conduct recognize problems in industrial relations be-
cause MNC's are organized in such a way that major decisions con-
cerning economic and commercial strategy affecting the entire operation
are often made at the highest level.
[C]entralized decision-making, especially in respect of deci-
sions affecting employment . . ., the organization of work,
the introduction of a central company philosophy into indus-
trial relations, which may be foreign and alien to local cus-
116 COMMISSION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 113; Multinational
Undertakings and the Community, supra note 113, at 11.
117 Following the practice of the United Nations, MNC's are also called transna-
tional corporations. The author has described the attempts to negotiate the most impor-
tant codes of conduct and has listed the relevant legal publications in this area. See
Kolvenbach, Verhaltenskodizes f.ir multinationale Unternehmen: Problem oder
Hoffnung?, in WETTBENVERBSORDNUNG UND WETTBEWERBSREALITAT FESTSCHRIFT
FOR ARNO S6LTER 381 (C.A. Andreae & Benisch eds. 1982); Kolvenbach, The Euro-
pean Economic Community and the Transnational Corporation, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 253 (1984); Kolvenbach, Bhopal - Storm over the Multinationals?,
15 ZGR 47 (1986); Kolvenbach, Neue Rechtsprobleme fir Multinationale Un-
ternehmen, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR BENISCH 453 (1989).
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toms . . . can undoubtedly affect the balance of power be-
tween management and labour; multinationals thus escape
the national social network and may become, or seem to be-
come, unaccessible to the local partners.
118
The Commission is of the opinion that "unfortunately these codes of
conduct have not achieved the desired transparency for all workers
since observance of these guidelines is voluntary and does not constitute
an obligation which is subject to legal sanction in the event of non-
compliance."' 1 9
The legislative institutions of the Community monitored the work
of the Commission in connection with MNC's. A delegation of the EP
drafted, jointly with representatives of the Congress of the United
States, a code of principles for international undertakings and govern-
ments. 20 In addition, the EP Committee on Economic and Monetary
Affairs presented a working document analyzing the role of
"[e]nterprises and governments in international economic activity" to
the EP Assembly. 2'
5.3.
Despite strong objections raised by UNICE and some Member
States, on October 1, 1980, the Commission passed the proposal for "A
Directive on Procedures for Informing and Consulting the Employees
of Undertakings with Complex Structures, in Particular Transnational
Undertakings."' 22 This proposal, the Vredeling Proposal, was intro-
duced by the then-responsible member of the Commission for Social
Affairs, the Dutch socialist Henk Vredeling, with the support of the
Belgian Commissioner Davignon. 
2
The proposed directive is important because it would be the first
internationally binding legislation regulating MNC's. The existing
codes of conduct are not binding and cannot, therefore, provide for legal
" R. BLANPAIN, THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
AND LABOUR RELATIONS 1976-1979, 17 (1979).
... Director General V, Discussion paper V/363/80-EN (Apr. 29, 1980) (unpub-
lished). One should not overlook the remark that "in this time of major difficulties in
the area of employment and social policy in the Community, the Commission could
take this opportunity to show workers that progress is still possible in social matters,
particularly as regards involvement in the affairs of their firms." Id.
120 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 118) 16 (1977).
121 EP Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, PE 66.923 (May 15,
1981). This report, which is named after the rapporteur M. Cahon, was adopted by the
EP on October 13, 1981. European Parliament, Report of Proceedings PE Z4.856
(Oct. 13, 1981).
122 Vredeling Proposal, supra note 5.
123 Id.
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sanctions in case of breach. The Commission is of the opinion that this
initiative is not in conflict with the existing codes, but that it is a fur-
ther step to achieve a binding regulation on a Community level for
MNC's.
Critics of the draft point out that many provisions show an incom-
plete understanding of corporate decision-making processes and indus-
trial relations practices. 24 They suggest that the proposed directive
could create an adverse relationship between employers and employees.
Instead of promoting more harmonious industrial relations, the compet-
itiveness of the Community and its industry would be reduced by obli-
gations which competitors in non-member states do not have to observe.
The proposed information procedure would create delays and difficul-
ties in the planning and implementation of envisaged measures. Fur-
thermore, Community legislation in this area is not necessary because
the existing guidelines are widely accepted and observed. 2
5.4.
The EP demanded substantial changes, thus requiring that the
first draft of the Commission be completely revised. The revised propo-
sal was submitted to the Council on July 13, 1983.126
The title of the proposed directive was shortened to "Directive on
Procedures for Informing and Consulting Employees."' 27 The phrase
"Undertakings with Complex Structures, in Particular Transnational
Undertakings" was deleted from the old title to avoid the argument that
the directive discriminates against MNCs operating in the EEC and so
results in different treatment of national and international
124 Few proposals of the Commission have found such unanimous opposition by
the industry of Member and non-Member States. Especially United States industrial
organizations, but also the Japanese industrial organization Keidanren, have protested
against the project of the Commission. For a general discussion, see Kolvenbach, The
European Economic Community and the Transnational Corporation, 5 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 253, 263 (1984).
125 For developments and publications up to September 1982, see Kolvenbach,
EEC Directive on Information and Consultation of Employees (Vredeling-Proposal),
10 INT'L Bus. LAW. 365 (1982), published in German, EG-Richtlinie uber die Infor-
mation und Konsultation der Arbeitnehmer (Vredeling-Initiative), 28 DER BETRIEB
1457 (1982). A documentation up to 1983 can be found in R. BLANPAIN, F. BLAN-
QUET, F. HERMAN & A. MONTY, THE VREDELING PROPOSAL (1983).
.28 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, DIRECTIVE ON PROCEDURES
FOR INFORMING AND CONSULTING EMPLOYEES, COM 292 FINAL (July 8, 1983),
published in 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 217) 3 (1983), correcting some of the trans-
lations, COM 292 FINAL/2 (January 9, 1984) [hereinafter Revised Vredeling Propo-
sal]; Employees Information and Consultation Procedures: Amended Proposal, 16
BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 1 (Supp. No. 2, 1983).
127 Revised Vredling Proposal, supra note 126.
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undertakings.' 28
The revised draft refers to the Social Action Program of the Coun-
cil and points out that "procedures for informing and consulting em-
ployees, as embodied in legislation or practised in the Member States,
are often inconsistent with the complex structure of the entity which
takes the decisions affecting them. . *."' This "may lead to unequal
treatment of employees affected by the decisions of one and the same
undertaking. ... "3 The aim of the amended proposal is "to ensure
that workers employed by a subsidiary in the Community are kept in-
formed as to the activities and prospects of the parent undertaking and
the subsidiaries as a whole so that they may assess the possible impact
on their interests. ... 131
The information and consultation procedures apply to employers
or organizations which as a whole employ at least 1000 workers in the
Community, regardless of whether the organization operates in one or
in several Member States. Where the decision-making center of the un-
dertaking is outside the Community, the disclosure and consultation re-
quirements have to be undertaken either by an authorized agent in the
Community designated by the outside parent company or, in the ab-
sence of such agent, the management of each subsidiary will be auto-
matically responsible for complying with the requirements of the direc-
tive. At least once a year, the management of a parent undertaking
must give explicit information on the activities of the parent and its
subsidiaries as a whole to the management of each subsidiary in the
Community. In addition, specific information pertaining to the produc-
tion or geographic area in which the subsidiary is active must be given.
"This information shall relate in particular to: (a) structure; (b) the
economic and financial situation; (c) the probable development of the
business and of production and sales; (d) the employment situation and
probable trends; (e) investment prospects." ' 2
The management of the subsidiary must communicate the infor-
mation without'delay to the employee representatives' 33 who may ask
128 Id.
129 Revised Vredeling Proposal supra, note 126, at 3; Employee Information and
Consultation Procedures: Amended Proposal, supra note 126, at 7.
130 Revised Vredeling Proposal supra, note 126, at 3; Employee Information and
Consultation Procedures: Amended Proposal, supra note 126, at 7.
131 Revised Vredeling Proposal, supra note 126, at 5; Employee Information and
Consultation Procedures: Amended Proposal, supra note 126, at 8.
132 Revised Vredeling Proposal, supra note 126, at 7; Employee Information and
Consultation Procedures: Amended Proposal, supra note 126, at 12.
13 Article I defines the term "employees' representatives" as "the employees' rep-
resentatives provided for by the laws or practice of the Member States. .. ." Revised
Vredeling Proposal, supra note 126, at 6; Employee Information and Consultation
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the management for all explanations that the management is required
to give. It is up to the management to state what information is to be
treated as confidential. If the management does not give the required
information to its employee representatives, the representatives may ad-
dress the management of the parent undertaking in writing. In that
case, the parent undertaking must communicate the information to the
management of the subsidiary.
This right of employee representative is supplemented by the right
to be consulted when central management plans to make a decision
"concerning thewhole or a major part of the parent undertaking or of
a subsidiary in the Community which is liable to have serious conse-
quences for the interests of the employees of its subsidiaries in the
Community. .. "'3' The reasons for the proposed decision, the legal,
economic and social consequences of the decision for the employees con-
cerned, and the measures planned with respect to such employees, must
be relayed to the employee representatives. Examples of decisions
which trigger consultation requirements are: the closure or transfer of
the whole or major parts of the establishment, restrictions or substantial
changes -to an undertaking's activities, major changes affecting organi-
zation, working practices or production methods "including modifica-
tions resulting from the introduction of new technologies,"' 35 as well as
the start or termination of long-term cooperation arrangements with
other undertakings and measures relating to employees' health and
safety.' 36 This list is not complete; however, these are the decisions
which "in particular" may lead to consultation procedures.
In the consultation process, the management of the subsidiary has
to communicate the required information to employee representatives,
in writing, and "without delay."' 37 The management must give the em-
ployee representatives at least 30 days in which to express their opin-
ions and to hold consultations with local management "with a view to
attempting to reach agreement on the measures planned in respect of
the employees."' 8 As soon as the opinion of the employee representa-
tives has been received, the management decision may be implemented.
Procedures: Amended Proposal, supra note 126, at 11.
134 Revised Vredeling Proposal, supra note 126, at 9; Employee Information and
Consultation Procedures: Amended Proposal, supra note 126, at 13-14.
136 Revised Vredeling Proposal, supra note 126, at 9; Employee Information and
Consultation Procedures: Amended Proposal, supra note 126, at 14.
13" Revised Vredeling Proposal, supra note 126, at 9; Employee Information and
Consultation Procedures: Amended Proposal, supra note 126, at 14.
13 Revised Vredeling Proposal, supra note 126, at 9; Employee Information and
Consultation Procedures: Amended Proposal, supra note 126, at 14.
18I Revised Vredeling Proposal, supra note 126, at 10; Employee Information
and Consultation Procedures: Amended Proposal, supra note 126, at 14.
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If after 30 days no opinion, or an opinion differing from the intended
decision, is submitted, management can nevertheless implement the de-
cision. The Commission mentions in its comments to the revised draft
that the directive does not give rights of co-determination as they exist
in many European laws.
A new element in employee representations in the EEC is the
right for management and employee representatives to conclude agree-
ments establishing a single body representing all employees of the par-
ent undertaking and its subsidiaries within the Community. This
would be, in effect, an international works council for the entire
workforce of an undertaking in the Community. The establishment of
"supranational" works councils has been a longstanding request of
trade unions.
The regulations regarding secrecy and confidentiality are highly
controversial. The management of an undertaking has the right to
withhold secret information, defined as information which, upon dis-
closure, "could substantially damage the undertaking's interests or lead
to the failure of its plans.""u 9 The term "interests of the undertaking"
means not only the interests of the subsidiary but also those of the par-
ent undertaking. The "interests of the undertaking" may be especially
damaged "where the legislation of the State (within or outside the
Community) to which it was subject prohibited the communication to
third parties of certain secret information."'04 The violation of such a
rule is considered to be damaging to the interests of the undertaking. 4
Disputes concerning the secret character of any information are to be
settled by tribunals or other competent national authorities. Employees,
their representatives, and the experts to whom they refer shall not re-
veal to third parties information which has been given in confidence,
"' Revised Vredeling Proposal, supra note 126, at 14; Employee Information
and Consultation Procedures: Amended Proposal, supra note 126, at 20.
140 Employee Information and Consultation Procedures: Amended Proposal,
supra note 126, at 6 (comments on the articles of the Directive).
141 Thus the Commission has taken account of legislation existing in various non-
Member Countries. For example, Switzerland punishes those who give a foreign au-
thority, organization or private business entity or their agents access to business secrets.
Also, the Business Records Protection Act of the Canadian Province of Ontario, ONT.
REv. STAT. ch. 56, § 1 (1980), prohibits the disclosure of certain information to juris-
dictions outside of Ontario. And the Australian Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of
Certain Evidence) Act of 1976, AUSTL. AcTs P. No. 121 (1976), is a relevant nondis-
closure act. Furthermore, United States companies subject to stock exchange or securi-
ties regulations objected to being required to disclose to the general public information
on future plans which have to be published to employees in EEC subsidiaries. Possible
liability for insider trading or other offenses was argued. See, e.g., Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1982). These examples illustrate the problems which might be created by
the Directive.
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Member States have to provide appropriate penalties for failure to
comply with these obligations.
Like all EEC directives, the Vredeling Proposal has to be imple-
mented by the Member States into their national law. In Article 9,
Member States were given until July 1, 1987 to comply with the direc-
tive. This was of course, conditional upon the directive being effected
by the Council within reasonable time.
5.5.
Recognizing strong opposition on the part of trade unions and in-
dustry, the draft provides for review two years after coming into effect.
Member States will be required to provide information enabling the
Commission to determine the effect of the directive's application upon
the Member States.
The extraterritorial aspects of the proposal are frequently debated.
In support thereof, the EEC authorities argue that the different legal
systems, under which MNCs operate, require coordination. Common
Market legislation does not apply, per se, to undertakings in non-
Member countries. In the past, some of the individual Member States
as well as the EEC as a whole strongly opposed the extraterritorial
effect of United States antitrust legislation. In fact, some Member
States even promulgated special legislation to protect local corporations
from the United States' requirements. 42 Ironically, in an address to the
American Society of International Law in Washington, D.C. on April
15, 1983, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam cited the
Vredeling proposal to demonstrate that the United States "is not alone
in applying its law to foreign entities or transactions."'14 3 Although sim-
ilar efforts have failed, the Vredeling proposal attempts to establish
concurrent jurisdiction of states over the activities of multinational
enterprises.
142 Examples are the British Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, 47 HALS-
BURY'S STAT. ch. 11 §§1-8, and the French law, No. 80-528 of July 16, 1980, J.O.
art. 1799. E.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11. Loi No. 80-528 du
12 juillet 1980, 1980 J.O. 1761, art. 1799, 1980 D.S.L. 279. The international impli-
cations of the extraterritorial application of foreign legislation are explained in Petit &
Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States
Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 697 (1982). See also Jacobs, Asserting Control over the
Conduct of Foreign Companies: The Main Issues Involved, 13 Swiss REv. INT'L AN-
TITRUST L. 3 (1981).
143 Dam, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 83 DEP'T ST. BULL.
48, 49 (1983).
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5.6.
The Commission's compromise draft still fails to satisfy the differ-
ing interests discussed supra.'1 ETUC considers the original proposal
of October 1980 to be a feasible compromise between worker and em-
ployer interests in the EEC. It believes that a directive "must not intro-
duce any deterioration in the legislative situation in the Member States
in which there is a high level of workers' rights, and that it should
bring improvements for countries where the level is lower.' 4*5 In its
present form, however, the directive, with its binding nature and mul-
tinational scope, may be regarded as an important step towards pro-
moting the rights of workers.
146
Industry organizations in non-Member states have also voiced
strong criticism. Keidanren, the Japanese Federation of Economic Or-
ganizations, claims that the directive would have "a restrictive effect on
the growth of Japanese investment in Europe and future industrial co-
operation between our two regions." 47 American business organiza-
tions express deep concern and fundamental objection to the concept of
the directive as a whole.' 48 Some of the lobbying methods employed
were previously unknown in Europe and invoked critical comments,
even in the United States. Indeed, some of the large multinational cor-
porations operating in Europe agreed that this lobbying was not in the
best interests of United States industry.'49
Finally, academic publications, both within and outside the EEC,
have attempted to evaluate the proposed directive and its possible
consequences. 15
0
144 See supra notes 113-43 and accompanying text.
'41 See Wyles, Unions call for key changes in Vredeling directive, Financial
Times (London), Nov. 3, 1983, sec. I, at 2 (ETUC Recommendations on the European
Commission's amended proposal for an EEC Directive on Procedures for Informing
and Consulting Employees of October 1983).
146 Id.
'" Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations, Second Statement of Opinion
on the Vredeling Proposal (May 17, 1983).
148 U.S. Industry Coordinating Group, Statement (Mar. 1983). The U.S. Indus-
try Coordinating Group represents the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the
United States Council for International Business, the National Foreign Trade Council,
the National Association of Manufacturers, and the American Chambers - Europe
(EUROMED). The National Foreign Trade Council urged American business to par-
ticipate in its work because "the European Communities will increasingly become a
significant legislative force during the remainder of the century and beyond." National
Foreign Trade Council, Statement on Proposed European Community Employee Infor-
mation and Consultation Directive (Oct. 12, 1983).
148 See Kamm, U.S. Firms Lobbying at Common Market Anger European Unions
and Officials, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1982, at 34, col. 4. See also MacDougall, Knocking
at the Door, Financial Times (London), Apr. 9, 1984, sec. I, at 14.
180 Battaille, The European Commission's Proposals on Worker Participation in
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5.7.
Considerable concern over the proposal has also been voiced in
some Member States. The British government has repeatedly stated
that employee involvement should be accomplished voluntarily and not
through legislative rules. On November 6, 1983, the British govern-
ment published a "Consultative Document" seeking "the view of indus-
try, commerce, the professions and trade unions on European Commis-
sion proposals on employee participation and company law
harmonization." 15' The government left no doubt that it rejects the
rigid proposal and that, in its opinion, "the main initiative ... to pro-
mote the involvement of employees in the enterprise for which they
work ... is best left to employers and employees, who are in the best
position to judge what best suits their particular circumstances."'
52
In its response to the government's Consultative Document, CBI
attacked both the Vredeling Initiative and the draft of the Fifth Direc-
tive, labeling them "unnecessary." Furthermore, if implemented, the
drafts would be "irrelevant to the needs of industry, counterproductive
to the achievement of wide-spread and genuine employee involvement,
damaging to competitiveness and largely impractical."'5 3
The Law Society expressed concern over the changes in the laws
the European Economic Community, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 517 (1981); Birk,
Unterrichtung und Anhbrung der Arbeitnehmer in transnationalen Unternehmen, in
GEDXCHTNISSCHRIFT FOR LEONTIN-JEAN CONSTANTINESCO 33 (1983); Carr & Kol-
key, US Perspective on the Vredeling Proposal and other Proposals by the EEC, 12
INT'L Bus. LAW. 57 (1984); Desouches & de Penanster, L'information des salaries
des multinationales: une tentative europbenne, 36 REV. TRIM. DR. COMM. & ECON.
509 (1983); Fera, The European Ecomonic Community and the Vredeling Proposal:
The Debate to temper Ideology with Realism, 16 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 250 (1986);
Goybet, La "Vredeling": Un Signal Politique Important, 27 REV. MARCHE CoM. 93
(1984); Hoffmann & Grewe, The Vredeling Proposal of the European Commission, 20
STAN. J. INT'L L. 329 (1984); Kolvenbach, supra note 124; Pipkorn, Die Mitwirkung-
srechte der Arbeitnehmer auf Grund der Kommissionvorschlage der Strukturrichtlinie
iiber der: Richline iiber die Unterrichtung und Anhbrung der Arbeitnehmer, 14 ZGR
267 (1985); Pipkorn, The Draft Directive on Procedures for Informing and Consult-
ing Employees, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 725 (1983); Schneebaum, supra note 79;
Timmermanns, Vredelingrichtlijn: gewijzigd voorstel Europese Commissie, 1983 TUD-
SCHRIFT FOOR VENNOOTSCHAPPEN, VERENIGINGEN EN STICHTINGEN [TVVS] 263;
Walker, The Vredeling Proposal: Cooperation versus Confrontation in European La-
bour Relations, 1 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 177 (Summer 1983); Westermann, supra
note 52; Note, The Proposed Vredeling Directive: A Modest Proposal or the Exporta-
tion of Industrial Democracy?, 70 VA. L. REV. 1469 (1984).
""' British Departments, supra note 60.
152 Id.
53 CBI Response, supra note 59. See Macintyre, CBI's Assault on Vredeling,
The Sunday Times (London), Feb. 19, 1984, at 52, col. 2. See also Krandsdorff, IOD
Reacts to the Vredeling Threat, Employee Participation, Financial Times (London),
Nov. 9, 1983, sec. II, at 17.
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of the United Kingdom that the Directive would require. "Most of the
changes would be in the field of employment but it would also affect
company law."' 5 4 TUC stressed its dismay over the delays accompany-
ing this Directive. It therefore supports the draft Directive and will
focus its campaigning on the Vredeling proposal.
155
The Federal Republic of Germany also voiced its official concerns.
Although the German Bundesrat recognizes the need to harmonize na-
tional laws which differ with respect to the information and consulta-
tion of employees, it wishes to proceed carefully in order not to impair
the slow and difficult restructuring of the economy, which is faced at
present with high unemployment. A framework under which the Mem-
ber States can adapt their specific legal structures is favored. The re-
vised draft is viewed cautiously because of its possible conflicts with
existing German co-determination regulations. 5 This potential for
conflict with existing co-determination legislation has been emphasized
both by German industry and in academic publications. 57 To alleviate
its concern, the Netherlands asked the SER for an opinion advising it
how to cast its vote in the Council.
1 58
5.8.
Although discussions in the Council are not public, it was evident
that a number of Member States had strong reservations about the
Commission's revised draft. In its report, the Irish Presidency stated
diplomatically that the discussions "brought to light several problems of
a political and technical nature."' 5 9 An ad hoc working group initiated
by the Irish President attempted to advance technical issues in the draft
and to clarify the position of Member States.'
60
The Council concluded its work, stating that "the Council has to
1"4 The Law Society's Standing Committee on Company Law, Memorandum on
the Vredeling Directive (Feb. 1984).
115 Trade Union Congress, supra note 56. See also The Participation Debate
Continued, supra note 56; Lloyd, TUC Likely to Back EEC Law, Financial Times
(London), Dec. 13, 1983, at 10.
156 Decision of Deutscher Bundesrat 379/88 (Feb. 3, 1984).
157 NOWACK, DIE EWG-RICHTLINIE UBER DIE UNTERRICHTUNG UND
ANH6RUNG DER ARBEITNEHMER (SOGENANNTE VREDELING-RICHTLINIE) (1985).
Hanau, Zum Entwurf einer EG-Richtlinie i~ber die Unterrichtung und Anhbrung der
Arbeitnehmer, 1984 RECHT DER ARBEIT [RDA] 157; Lehmann, Kritische
Anmerkungen zum gednderten Vorschlag fur eine Richtlinie iiber die Unterrichtung
und Anhbrung der Arbeitnehmer (Vredeling-Richtlinie), 1984 RDA 160.
158 Slagter, SER - advies over de Vredeling-Richtlien, 1984 TVVS 121.
15 Irish President, Report 10914/84 (Dec. 3, 1984). See New Approach on
"Vredeling", EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., Feb. 1985, at 10.
180 Irish President, supra note 159. See New Approach on "Vredeling", supra
note 159.
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date been unable to reach agreement on this proposal for a Direc-
tive." '161 The need for a social dialogue at all levels was nevertheless
generally acknowledged, particularly in view of the rising level of un-
employment and the large-scale introduction of new technology. Its
conclusions were as follows:
The Council
1) Considers that the problem of informing and consulting
employees is of great political and economic importance and
that the solution to this problem can contribute towards im-
proving relations between management and labour and thus
towards a better performance by the undertakings and econ-
omies of the Member States;
2) Emphasizes the importance of a social area in the con-
text of the completion of the Community internal market
and the need for greater convergence between the rights of
employees in the Member States to be informed and con-
sulted regarding major decisions in the undertakings
concerned;
3) Note that it has been unable to find a solution to this
problem on the basis of the amended proposal for a Directive
submitted by the Commission to the Council on 13 July
1983, and recalls that on 13 June 1985 it noted that in some
Member States this problem came solely under collective
agreements and that, before examining the said proposal fur-
ther, a solution to this issue of principle would have to be
found;
4) Invites the Commission to:
-continue its work on this subject and to follow closely devel-
opments in national legislation in this area and agreements
concluded between management and labour regarding the in-
formation and consultation of employees,
-continue its close contacts with management and labour
with a view to reporting back to the Council each year on
major developments in this respect;
5) Will resume, at the beginning of 1989, on the basis of
these reports, its examination either of the amended proposal
for the said Directive or of any other proposal which the
Commission might submit to it concerning the information
and consultation of employees;
6) Invites the employers' and employees' organizations in
161 29 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 203) 1 (1986).
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the Community to continue their dialogue on the subject at
all levels with a view to arriving at agreements, at the appro-
priate level, which provide for information and consultation
of employees, inter alia when new technology is introduced,
and recalls in this connection the text of the new Article 118
B of the Treaty, as provided for in Article 22 of the Single
European Act and reading as follows:
'The Commission shall endeavour to develop the dia-
logue between management and labour at European level
which could, if the two sides consider it desiarble [sic], lead
to relations based on agreement. '162
Since these Conclusions have been published, questions in the EP
repeatedly stress the necessity to inform and consult employees. Refer-
ring to special cases, the EP has called upon the Commission "to take
fresh initiatives in consultation with both sides of industry in order to
ensure that a directive is adopted as soon as possible."' 6 s In other draft
directives, the Commission has emphasized the necessity to inform and
consult with employees.1
4
5.9.
When presenting the working program of the Commission for
1988,16 President Jacques Delors specifically mentioned the "social di-
mension" of the Common Market and pointed out that under Article
118 social policy has become part of the Single European Act and that
it will be a key for the success of the internal market. He announced
that the Commission wants to further social dialogue despite its diffi-
culties and that, therefore, it will propose that the Statute for a Euro-
pean Company include more than one model for worker participation
in order to give the Member States their choice of models. 66 On De-
cember 7, 1987, the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund presented priorities
162 29 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. C 203) 1 (1986) (Council's conclusions 7536/86 on
the Vredeling Directive (July 21, 1986)).
163 European Parliament, PE 108.542 to 544 (Sept. 11, 1986). See also 30 O.J.
EUR. CoMM. (No. C 177) 20 (1987); 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 93) 8 (1988); 31
O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. C 148) 9 (1988).
164 Examples are the proposed merger control regulation and the proposal for a
Thirteenth Directive on Takeover Bids. 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 148) 9 (1988).
168 The Commission's Programme for 1988, 21 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 8
(No. 1, 1988).
168 In a speech before the sixth ETUC Congress at Stockholm on May 12, 1988,
Delors again emphasized the importance and necessity for the Commission to step up
its social dialogue with management and labor. See The Social Dimension of Building
Europe, 21 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 8 (No. 5, 1988).
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which the trade unions asked the German EEC Presidency to observe
for the first half of 1988. On behalf of the other' European trade un-
ions, the commitment to the political integration of Europe and the
completion of the internal market was reiterated; referring to the ur-
gency of the Fifth and Tenth Directives, the publication insisted on
strengthening the social component of the European Market, which in-
cludes information, consultation and the right of worker participa-
tion.16 The German Federation of Employers (Bundesvereinigung der
Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande) has noted the far-reaching conse-
quences of the term "social space." The German worker participation
legislation could become a stumbling block for future developments in
this area unless the German trade unions agree to a corresponding re-
duction of employee rights under present legislation.' 6
These discussions in the Federal Republic of Germany reflect the
importance of the social dimension to the, completion of the internal
market. The Ger-man Presidency used the European Council at Hano-
ver and its own 1988 semi-annual report to plead for a solution to the
social problems before the EP, and for a resolution to the differences of
opinion between the Member States in these matters. Finally, discuss-
ing new proposals for the European Company, Delors asked the EP to
avoid the "sterile controversial discussions of worker participation. '" 9
It is interesting to observe that since the beginning of 1988, EEC
topics such as "social standard," "multinational corporations," ".merger
control" and others have one common thread: employee rights to infor-
mation, consultation and participation in companies. The pressure has
mounted to create a "social area" within the EEC. The Greek Presi-
dency, during the second half of 1988, and the Spanish Presidency,
during the first half of 1989, have stated that this topic is urgently
important and have underlined the necessity of attaching more empha-
sis to social policy. On September 7, 1988, the Commission, based on
the conclusions of the European Council's meeting in Hanover on June
27-28, 1988, released a Communication entitled "The Social Dimen-
sion of the Internal Market" which covers a variety of areas, including
employment growth, social cohesion and social dialogue. The social dia-
logue or consultation is indispensable since agreement is regarded as
the basis of EEC legislation and ensures its implementation. In its at-
tached list of proposals, the Communication also mentions a directive
167 Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, Beschluss des Geschiftsfiihrenden Bundesvor-
standes des DGB (Dec. 7, 1987) (unpublished manuscript).
"E.G. Erdmann, Vor Gesellschaftspolitischen Weichenstellungen (May 26,
1988) (unpublished manuscript).
1"9 Handelsblatt, July 7, 1988, at 8.
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concerning the information and consultation of employees which the
Commission had wanted to propose in 1988 and which was to be ac-
cepted by the Council in 1989.
5.9.1.
A report dated October 6, 1988,17' drawn up on behalf of the EP
Committee on Social Affairs and Employment, was discussed at great
length on October 28, 1988, and was adopted the same day17' by a
substantial majority. In the report, the EP reaffirms its strong opposi-
tion to the Council's postponement until 1989 of further debates on the
Draft Vredeling Directive. Furthermore, the EP calls upon the Com-
mission to present a new draft directive based on Article 118 A and
demands the inclusion of a section on disclosure of information and
consultation in the new draft statute for a European company. The
Commission must also propose ways in which the social problems asso-
ciated with the creation of the internal market can best be discussed,
particularly the development of European-level collective bargaining
within multinational companies. With respect to pan-European collec-
tive bargaining:
[The EP] Calls on the Commission, on the basis of Article
1M8 b of the EEC Treaty, to draft as a matter of urgency a
directive on the role of management and labour in the com-
pletion of the internal market, outlining the tangible condi-
tions for organizing a European social area and covering the
following points:
-the removal of obstacles to the creation of European con-
tractual relations, the potential outcome of the 'social'
dialogue,
-clarifying the connection between these relations at Euro-
pean level and those at other levels,
-setting up an institutional forum where labour questions in
the Europe without frontiers may be raised and discussed,
-the development of contractual relations within European
multinational companies."1 2
In the explanatory statement attached to this resolution of the EP,
170 1988-1989 EUR. PARL. REP. (No. A 2-211/88/A) 1 (Oct. 6, 1988); 1988-
1989 EUR. PARL. REP. (No. A 2-211/88/B) 1 (Oct. 6, 1988); 31 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 309) 104 (1988).
171 European Parliament, PE 126.864 (Oct. 28, 1988). For a summary, see Euro-
pean Parliament on Workers' Rights, 179 EUR. INDUS. REL. REv., Dec. 1988, at 2.
172 1988 EUR. PARL. REP. (No. A 2-211/88/A) 1 (Oct. 6, 1988).
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the dialogue between labor and management is marked as an instru-
ment of regulation on par with other provisions. The harmonization of
conditions of employment and work in the Community should not be
entrusted solely to regulations and directives. In view of the current
variety of systems in force in the various Member States, it would be
an illusion to hope for European collective agreements. The concept,
therefore, must be standardized as the rights and obligations of the two
sides of industry differ from one Member State to another. These dif-
ferences concern matters as fundamental as the nature of contractual
commitment, the legal capacity of partners, and the role of the state.
Furthermore, a fundamental problem is the combining of a "European
contractual level" with other levels (e.g., interprofessional collective
agreements, agreements at branch level, negotiations by undertakings).
The EP calls on the Commission to clarify this problem and to put
forward practical proposals in the area.
173
Supporting a procedural directive for informing and consulting the
employees of complex undertakings, the EP not only restated its "une-
quivocal opposition to the Council's unilateral decision to freeze this
matter until 1989 at the earliest," 74 but also stated its belief "that the
appropriate legal instrument to achieve the desired political objective,
i.e. a standardized procedure for informing and consulting employees at
common and Community level, is the directive"' 75 under Article 118 A
of the Treaty. The EP's insistence on a directive counters the statement
of the Council in its Conclusion of July 21, 1986,176 in which the two
sides of industry were invited to continue their dialogue on the subject
at all levels with an eye to arriving at agreements which provide, inter
alia, for information and consultation of employees when new technolo-
gies are introduced.
On January 12, 1989, the effort for "social dialogue" continued
with the establishment of a joint committee to focus on social and labor
problems associated with the development of the Single Internal Mar-
ket.177 Both UNICE and CEEP (public sector employer organizations)
and ETUC will continue to cooperate in this committee. The Commis-
sion will request the opinion of these partners in industry with respect
to the concept of a draft on social rights and with respect to a statute
for a European company, particularly in relation to its provisions on
employee representation.
173 1988 EUR. PARL. REP. (No. A 2-211/88/B) 1 (Oct. 6, 1988).
174 Id. at 38.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 39. See also 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 203) 1 (1986).
17 Relaunch of "Social Dialogue", EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., Feb. 1989, at 2.
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A charter on basic social rights must recognize that the framework
of such rights has already been defined through the Conventions of the
International Labor Organization ("ILO"), the Social Charter of the
Council of Europe and the Social Security Code of the OECD. 178
On February 22, 1989, the ESC recognized basic social rights
which are to be applied across all Member States. It avoided any title
such as "Charter" or "Convention" and issued an opinion regarding
such basic social rights instead. These social rights will be guaranteed
by instruments made available in the Treaty of Rome in order to en-
sure the "balanced implementation of the internal market necessary to
avoid the risks of unfair competition. . . . 179To avoid long and sterile
debates on the rights to be included, the opinion recommends the adop-
tion of the rights already set out in numerous ILO Conventions, Coun-
cil of Europe charters and protocols of United Nations resolutions.
Among the listed principles is one stating that the EEC must create its
own social policy but that Member States must be free to legislate,
leaving employers and trade unions the freedom to negotiate.' 80 In the
opinion of the Commission, the EP and the ESC, the creation of the
European social dimension no longer requires a uniform set of national
rights. On the contrary, the specific characteristics of each country con-
stitute part of the wealth of Europe as a whole. Rather than requiring
detailed legislation (as some draft directives have attempted to achieve
in the past), agreement over guiding principles of social policy need
only be reached. Each Member State has several choices as to the
means it will use to implement these principles. The chosen implemen-
tation will be monitored by uniform procedures.
The "Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers"
was adopted by the European Council at Strasbourg on December 8-9,
1989. To implement this Charter, the Commission prepared an action
program containing a number of measures that it considered necessary
in order to achieve the rights proclaimed in the Charter. The Commis-
sion announced in this program that, "following consultation with the
social partners:"
[The Commission will prepare] a draft for a Community in-
strument which, in substance, could follow the under-men-
178 Progress on Draft Charter, EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., Mar. 1989, at 2. The
inaugural meeting of the Social Dialogue Steering Committee took place on March 21,
1989. "Social Dialogue" Steering Committee Meets, EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., May
1989, at 2.
179 EEC: Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on Basic Social Rights
within the Community, EUR. INDUS. REL. REv., May 1989, at 32.
180 Id.
1990]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
tioned principles:
- Establishment of equivalent systems of worker representa-
tionin all European-scale enterprises.
- General and periodic information should be provided
regardingthe development of the enterprise as it affects the
employment and the interests of the workers.
- Information must be provided and consultations should
takeplace before taking any decision liable to have serious
consequences for the interests of the employees, in particu-
lar, closures, transfers, curtailment of activities, substantial
changes with regard to organization, working practices,
production methods, long-term cooperation with other un-
dertakings, etc.
- The dominant associated undertakings shall provide
theinformation necessary for the employer to inform the
employees" representatives.''
6. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPING ("EEIG")
On July 25, 1985, the Council issued Regulation 2137/85.182 The
legal instrument of regulation, which has a directly applicable effect,
was used to create the first corporate body at the community level (the
BEIG has been termed the first "supranational" company law instru-
ment). It was modeled after the French "groupement d'intfrt
6conomique" which has existed since 1967 and has been used success-
fully in France for international cooperations of great dimension like
Airbus Industry and Ariane Espace. The purpose of the new instru-
ment is to facilitate cross-frontier cooperation. Its direct incorporation
into community law fills a gap in both the national laws of the Mem-
ber States and the community law itself. The development of the drafts
reveals the difficulty of establishing a new corporate form on a Euro-
pean level that accounts for the employee participative rights which ex-
ist in some Member States.
The first draft in 1974 stated that "a grouping may not have more
than 250 employees."' 83 This limit was increased in the second draft to
500 employees, and was retained by the final regulation. The second
181 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, COMMUNITY CHARTER OF
BASIC SOCIAL RIGHTS FOR WORKERS, COM No. 568 FINAL (Nov. 20, 1989).
182 28 O.J. BUR. COMM. (No. L 199) 1 (1985); 20 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 1
(Supp. No. 3, 1987).
183 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 14) 30, 32 (1974).
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draft"" also emphasized the protection of employees' interests, particu-
larly when the grouping is formed or is voluntarily terminated.
Before a grouping is created, an obligation to inform the work
force exists. This communication enables employees or their representa-
tives to assess the grouping's effect on their interests. Under Article la,
"[t]he employees concerned, or their representatives shall be notified in
good time before a grouping is formed."' 85 If the employees or their
representatives believe that their interests will be adversely affected,
then the measures to be implemented for their benefit must be devel-
oped through negotiations between the management that seeks to form
the grouping and the employees or their representatives.' 86 Article 16a
of the amended proposal addresses the situation where employees or
their representatives believe that their interests will be adversely af-
fected by the intended termination of a European Cooperation Group-
ing.'87 In this situation, the manager or managers of the grouping will
consult with the employees or their representatives on the measures to
be taken in favor of the employees (the social plan), before the decision
to terminate at the general meeting is made. The agreement on a social
plan must be written and the manager must inform the general meeting
of the outcome of the social plan negotiations.'
The final wording of the regulation was strongly influenced by
Member States that already have institutionalized employee representa-
tion. The limitation of the workforce to 500 employees was introduced
to ensure that the EEIG cannot develop into a large enterprise. The
Federal Republic of Germany insisted on this limitation to avoid com-
plications with existing German co-determination legislation.
In addition, Article 3.2, introduced in connection with co-determi-
nation regulations, provides that "a grouping may not: (a) exercise, di-
rectly or indirectly, a power of management or supervision over its
members' own activities or over the activities of another undertaking, in
particular in the fields of personnel, finance and investment."'8 9 The
trade unions, in particular, insisted on clauses that would avoid an ero-
sion of co-determination. Article 3.2 makes it unnecessary to retain spe-
cial regulations to protect the employees' interests at the foundation or
liquidation of the EEIG. One of its clauses expressly states that in mat-
184 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 103) 4, 7 (1978).
186 Id. at 6.
186 Id.
.8. Id. at 13. European Cooperation Grouping is the former name for European
Economic Interest Grouping.
188 Id.
188 28 O.J. EUR. CoMM . (No. L 199) 1, art. 3.2(a), at 3; 20 BULL. EUR. COMMU-
NITIES 1 (Supp. No. 3, 1987).
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ters not addressed by the Regulation, such as social and labor laws, the
laws of the Member States and Community Law apply.' 90 This guar-
antees that the extant protection of employee rights in some Member
States will also apply to the new corporate unit.
It is remarkable that the EEIG represents the first instance that
the Council has agreed upon a Community-wide legal instrument for
cross-border cooperation and the first time that compromises have satis-
fied the interests of the social partners concerning employee rights.' 9'
7. STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY
The Commission has always taken the view that the legal frame-
work, within which European undertakings must operate because of
differing national characters, does not correspond to the economic
framework which the Community has developed. To overcome this gap,
the Commission intended to permit the formation of companies which
are only subject to a special legal system directly applicable in all
Member States, in addition to companies governed by national laws.
The Commission has suggested "Societas Europea" ("S.E.") as a cen-
tralized incorporation option for companies that wish to be considered
domestic in all Member States. The idea originated in the Netherlands
and was promoted heavily by France. The new corporate form was
intended to strengthen intercompany cooperation and to facilitate cross-
border activities of multinational corporations.
7.1.
The Commission asked a group of experts, chaired by Professor
Pieter Sanders of the Legal Faculty of the University of Rotterdam, to
examine the legal questions and aspects of a statute for European com-
panies. In December 1966, this group presented a first draft of a stat-
ute for European companies.'92 In this study, Sanders noted that
190 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 199) 1, art. 3.2(d), at 3; 20 BULL. EUR. COMMU-
NITIES 1 (Supp. No. 3, 1987).
291 Ganske, Die Europaische Wirtschaftliche Interessenvereinigung (EWIV)- eine
neue "supranationale" Unternehmensform als Kooperations- instrument in der
Europdischen Gemeinschaft, DER BETRIEB - BEILAGE, Aug. 30, 1985, No. 20;
Gleichmann, Europdische Wirtschaftliche Interessenvereinigung, 149 ZHR 633
(1985); Israel, Une Avan~e du Droit Communautaire: Le Groupement Europ~en
d'Intbrt Ecomonique (GEIE), 292 REV. MARCHP CoM. 645 (1985); Timmermanns,
Nieuwe Europese Rechtsvorm: Europees Ecomonish Samen-Werkingsverband (EESV),
1985 TVVS 229.
192 P. SANDERS, VORENTWURF EINES STATUTS FuR EUROPXISCHE AK-
TIENGESELLSCHAFTEN (Studien-Reihe Wettbewerb - Rechtsangleichung der Kommis-
sion der Europischen Gemeinschaften, No. 6, 1967). This study was drafted in Ger-
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worker participation was an important point to resolve, especially for
Germany and France as they already have co-determination regula-
tions. The Commission realized that this problem would be one of the
major difficulties. Consequently, it asked Professor G~rard Lyon-Caen
of the University of Paris to develop different models for the represen-
tation of employees in a future European company. His study ad-
dressed participation in the decision-making process at the shop-floor
level as well as representation in the corporate management. 19 3 In the
spring of 1970, the Commission also discussed the question of employee
participation with trade unions and employer organizations of the
Member States.'
The Commission's first draft, entitled "Proposal for a Council
Regulation on the Statute for European Companies of 1970,"' 9 indi-
cated that the differences between the co-determination regulations of
the Member States, particularly the representation of employees in cor-
porate management, rendered harmonization with respect to national
laws difficult. The Commission proposed that European companies op-
erating in different Member States have national employee representa-
tion on a European Works Council. This European Works Council
("EWC") would be responsible for all matters involving more than one
establishment. The EWC's members would be elected by a direct vote
of all employees of the establishment. 96 The draft also provided for
one-third of the members of a company organ to be appointed by the
national representation of employees. One of the three employee repre-
sentatives of this company organ does not have to be employed by the
European company.
The discussion in the EEC institutions indicate that employee par-
ticipation would become the focal point of disagreement. The ESC
opinion acknowledged that the Commission attempted to develop a
man and published in French, German, Dutch and Italian.
19 G. LYON-CAEN, CONTRIBUTION A L'ETUDE DES MODES DE REPRESENTATION
DES INT-RLTS DES TRAVAILLEURS DANS LE CADRE DES SOCIPT S ANONYMES
EUROPEENNES (Serie Concurrence - Rapprochement des Legislations No. 10, 1970).
This study has been published in French and German.
194 The idea of a supranational legal form for European companies has a long
history. See Gleichmann & Cathala, Le Statut des Socitbs Anonymes Europ~ennes
Selon la Proposition de la Commission des Communaut~s Europgennes 1972 REVUE
DES Sociifs 8; Hood, The European Company Proposal, 22 INT'L & ComIP. L.Q.
434 (1973); Pipkorn, Zur Entwicklung des Europaischen Gesellschaftsund Un-
ternehmensrecht (II), 141 ZHR 330 (1977); Pipkorn, supra note 30.
1l 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. C 124) 1 (1970); Proposed Statute for the Euro-
pean Company, 3 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 1 (Supp. No. 8, 1970).
9' Professor Sanders has suggested that employee representation at the shop floor
be governed by the national legislation of each Member State. See P. SANDERS, supra
note 192.
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compromise between the different systems and attitudes that existed in
the Member States (which then numbered six), but suggested a redraft
of the proposal.
197
The EP favored a European Company Statute as a valuable in-
strument not only for economic reasons, but also for political purposes.
In addition to making some changes in the European Works Council
proposal, the EP initially proposed a highly controversial composition
of the supervisory board.
The compromise proposed that a supervisory board be comprised
of one-third shareholder representatives, one-third employee represent-
atives, and one-third members (the "third bench") elected by the two
other groups. The shareholders assembly, the European Works Coun-
cil, and the management board would nominate potential members to
the "third bench." Representatives of "the general interest" who have
the necessary knowledge and are not dependent on the interests of
shareholders, employees or their respective organizations, would be eli-
gible for nomination. Election to the supervisory board would require a
two-thirds majority.
198
The Commission presented an amended proposal on May 13,
1975 which accounted for the opinions of the ESC and the EP, and
which made the adjustments necessitated by the accession of Denmark,
Ireland, and the United Kingdom to the EEC.'99 Title V of the propo-
sal, "Representation of Employees in the European Company," pro-
vides for a European Works Council and membership for employees on
the supervisory board.200
7.1.1.
A European Works Council ("EWC") must be formed if a Euro-
pean company has at least two establishments in different Member
States each employing at least fifty workers. Since national employees'
representation will continue, national works councils and an EWC will
exist side by side.201 A group works council must be formed if the Eu-
ropean company has at least two establishments in the same Member
State.202
197 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. C 131) 32 (1972).
198 17 O.J. EUR. COMM., (No. C 93) 22 (1974).
199 Proposalfor a Council Regulation on the Statute for European Companies, 8
BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 1 (Supp. No. 4, 1975).
200 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. C 124) 1, 23-29 (1970); Proposed Statute for the
European Company, supra note 195, at 87-122.
201 For a thorough analysis, see Birk, Europdiische Aktiengesellschaft und nation-
ales Betriebsverfassungsrecht, 5 ZFA 47 (1974).
202 Id. at 65.
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Members of the EWC are elected by the employees of all the es-
tablishments of a company.203 During their term of office, the members
of the EWC are relieved from their work responsibilities if the EWC
considers it necessary.20 4 The EWC must regularly inform its constitu-
ency of its progress, except for. information declared confidential by the
management board. The EWC's competence covers all matters which
concern more than one establishment located in at least two Member
States, and which cannot be settled by the national employees' repre-
sentative bodies. These problems primarily arise out of the existence of
a transnational company with an international workforce. The EWC
cannot be a party to collective bargaining agreements. 0 5
The information rights of the EWC are similar to the rights of
national works councils that already exist in some Member States.
Communications and documents sent to shareholders must also be sub-
mitted to the EWC. These documents include annual accounts and re-
ports, consolidated or partially consolidated accounts, and consolidated
annual reports. The information must be conveyed in writing if, in the
opinion of the EWC, a matter affects the fundamental interests of the
European company or its employees.2 6
The management board must consult with the EWC regarding
certain matters, including the employees' work responsibilities, compen-
sation, working time, training, industrial safety, and the management of
social facilities. In these matters the agreement of the EWC is
required.207
If, in the opinion of the EWC, employees' interests will be ad-
versely affected by management decisions, the management board must
negotiate with the EWC to reach agreement on employee-related mea-
sures. Such negotiations must take place before the supervisory board
makes a decision. Disputes or disagreements must be settled by an arbi-
tration board, composed equally of representatives from the EWC and
the management board. A chairperson will be appointed by mutual
agreement, or, if necessary, by a competent court of justice.208
203 Annex II of the proposed Statute for European Companies sets forth a com-
plete listing of the rules for election of the EWC members. Proposal for a Council
Regulation on the Statute for European Companies, supra note 199, Annex II, at 124.
20I Id. art. 113, at 60.
205 Id. art. 119, at 61-62.
208 Id. arts. 120-122, at 62.
207 Id. arts. 123-125, at 63-64.
208 Id. arts. 126-129, at 64-65.
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7.1.2.
The prop6sal provides for representation of employees on supervi-
sory boards, although a majority of a company's employees can waive
board representation in a "pre-election." The representatives are
elected by all employees and have the same rights and duties as the
other members of the supervisory board. One of three employee repre-
sentatives may be an individual who is not employed by the European
company, such as an outside trade union official. If there are more than
three employee representatives, two outside individuals can serve as em-
ployee representatives." 9 In companies with more than one establish-
ment, electors representing the various establishments elect the em-
ployee representatives.
The EP amended the first draft of the proposal with Article 74a,
stating that "[tlhe supervisory board shall consist as to one-third of rep-
resentatives of the shareholders, as to one-third of representatives of the
employees and as to one-third of members co-opted by these two
groups."21 ° Candidates for co-option may be nominated by the general
meeting, the employee's representative body, or the management
board. 1' Their qualifications are described in Article 75a(3), which
declares that "[o]nly persons representing general interests, possessing
the necessary knowledge and experience, and not directly dependent on
the shareholders, the employees or their respective organizations may
be nominated."2"2 They are elected with two-thirds of the votes of the
supervisory board.21 3
All members of the supervisory board must safeguard the interests
of the company and its personnel. They must also exercise proper dis-
cretion with respect to confidential information.214
Members of the management board are appointed by a majority
vote of the supervisory board for a term of office of up to six years.
Thus, employees can indirectly influence the management of the
company.
The amended draft was welcomed in principle by industry and
trade unions. However, the proposal that recommended employee rep-
resentation on the supervisory board was strongly criticized. Academi-
cians considered the draft to be an interesting step toward a unified
209 Annex III of the draft statute regulates in detail the election procedure for the
representatives to the Supervisory Board. Id. Annex III, at 130.
210 Id. art. 74a, at 44.
211 Id. art. 75a, at 45-46.
212 Id. art. 75a(3), at 46.
213 Id. art. 75b, at 46.
214 Id. art. 80, at 48.
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legal system for companies in Europe.21 5
For technical discussions, the Council appointed an ad hoc Work-
ing Party which, between 1976 and 1982, labored through the first
25 Numerous publications have discussed not only employee participation, but
also the formal and structural regulations of the draft statute. See J. BA1RMANN,
EUROPXISCHE INTEGRATION IP. GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (1970); E. STEIN, HARMONI-
ZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW: NATIONAL REFORM AND TRANSNATIONAL
COORDINATION (1971). See also Allegri, Una proposta della commissione CEE al con-
siglio dei ministri della communita in tema di societa anonima europea, 1970
RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETA [Riv. SOcIETA] 1248; Angelici, La proposta de regolamento
relative allo statuto delle societa per azioni europea, S.I.O.I., L'INCIDENZA DEL DIR-
ITTO COMUNITARIO NELL'ORDINAMENTO ITALIANO, parte II, 127 (1981); Birmann,
Supranationale Aktiengesellschaften?, 36 ARCHIV FUR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 156
(1957); Bayer, Europidische Vertragskonzerne und europdisches Gesellschaftsrecht, in
FESTSCHRIFT FOR ERNST GESSLER 227 (1971); Beneduce, Per una Disciplina
Europea delle Societa per Azioni: II Bilancio (pt. 1), 60 RIVISTA DEL DIRITTO Com-
MERCIALE 186 (1962); Capotorti, La societa commerciale europea: un progetto di esito
incerto, 16 IL DIRITTO DEL L'ECONOMIA 221 (1970); Crut, Les traits fondamentaux
de la proposition modifige sur la socitO europ~enne, LA VIE JUDICIAIRE, 12 au 18
Juin 1978, at 1; Dabin, Objectives Communautaires et reception du droit allemand
dans le statut des socits anonymes europgennes, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERNST VON
CAEMMERER 807 (H. Fickes ed. 1978); Ficker, Zur Zusammenfassung europiaischer
Unternehmen, 23 NJW 1569 (1970); Fornasier, Toward a European Company, 4
COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 51 (1969); Gessler, Grundfragen der europdiischen Handel-
sgesellschaft, 10 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 381 (1967); Gleichmann, Uberblick iiber
neue Kooperationsformen und i~ber Entwicklungen im Gesellschaftsrecht der
Europiiischen W1irtschaftsgemeinschaft, 1988 AG 159; Houin, OZ en est le droit des
socit~s dans le March Commun, 4 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPIEENEE
[REV. TRIM. DROIT EUR.] 131 (1968); Lanza, Armonizzazione, societa europea e legge
uniforme per le societa, 1970 RIv. SOciETA 1226; Lutter, A European Contractual
Group-Company, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 53 (1972); Lyon-Caen, La repr~sentation
des intkr~ts des travailleurs dans les socigt~s europgennes, 7 REV. TRIM. DROIT EUR.
473 (1971); Migliazza, I Problemi di Diritto Internazionale Relativi alla Creazione di
una Societa Commerciale Europea, 6 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE
PRIVATO E PROGESSUALE 761 (1970); Minervini, Alcuni problemi connessi alla crea-
zione di una societa di tipo europeo, 11 Riv. SOCiETA 984 (1966); Norton, A Chesire
Cat Affair: The European-type Company and Its Meaning for the American Enter-
prise in the European Community, 6 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 111 (1973); Pintus, La
Societa per Azioni Europea, 12 RIVISTA DI DIRITTo EUROPEO 251 (1972); Pipkorn,
Das Statut filr Europdische Aktiengesellschaften nach dem gedinderten Vorschlag der
Kommission, 1975 AG 318; Purpura, La Cogestione e la Societa per Azioni Europea,
10 DIRITTO NEGLI SCAMBI INTERNAZIONALI 337 (1971); Sanders, The European
Company on its Way, 8 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 29 (1971); Sanders, Die europdische
Aktiengesellschaft: Probleme des Zugangs und der Mitbestimmung, 1967 AG 344;
Schmitthoff, Multi-National Companies, 1970 INT'L Bus. LAW. 177; Scholten, The
European Company, 5 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9 (1967-68); Scholten, Company Law
in Europe, 4 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 377 (1966); Storm, Statute of a Societas
Europaea, 5 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 265 (1967-68); Vagts & Waelde, The Societas
Europaea: A Future Option for U.S. Corporations?, 29 Bus. LAW. 823 (1974); van
Ryn, Le projet de statut des socits europ~ennes, 7 REV. TRIM. DROIT EUR. 563
(1971); von der Groeben, Auf dem Wege zur europdischen Aktiengesellschaften, 1967
AG 95; Waelde, Die "Europiiische Aktiengesellschaft" und multinationale Un-
ternehmen, 1974 AUOENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST DES BETRIEBS-BERATERS 82; Walther,
Das Statut fir Europiiische Aktiengesellschaften aus der Sicht der Wirtschaft, 1972
AG 99.
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reading in "a constructive and rather positive atmosphere." '216 Work
was suspended in 1982 and has not yet been resumed.
7.2.
In the internal market White Paper,2 17 the statute for the Euro-
pean company was mentioned as one of the objectives to be achieved by
1992. In Brussels, on June 29, 1987, the European Council requested
the relevant Councils "to make swift progress with regard to the com-
pany law adjustments required for the creation of a European Com-
pany." '218 In view of the difficulties in overcoming the worker participa-
tion problem, it was not expected that the Commission would hasten to
present new proposals.
The Commission, in its Memorandum of July 15, 1988 to the
Council, the EP, and the two sides of industry,219 carefully avoided
drafting a completely new statute for a European company. Instead, the
Commission listed the main difficulties with the European company
Statute, "in particular the question of worker participation in the com-
pany decision-making process and attempts to put forward solutions"
because political initiatives at community level gave the Commission
reason to revive the plan to create a European company.220 The Com-
mission invited the EP, the Council, and the two sides of industry to
express their views on the "broad lines of this Memorandum before the
Commission makes a formal proposal.
221
The Memorandum noted:
Cross-frontier cooperation in the Community is not only an
essential aspect of the creation of a genuine Common Mar-
ket, [but that] it is at the same time absolutely vital if the
Community's national enterprises in major industrial sectors
are to maintain and improve a competitive market position,
both at home and in the world at large.222
216 20 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 9 (No. 6, 1987).
211 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 24.
218 20 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 9 (No. 6, 1987).
219 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, MEMORANDUM, COM No.
320 FINAL (July 15, 1988); Internal Market and Industrial Cooperation: Statute for
the European Company, 21 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES 1 (Supp. No. 3, 1988). For a
summary see Kolvenbach, Statutflr die Europd2ische Aktiengesellschaft, 36 DER BE-
TRIEB 1837 (1988).
220 EEC: Memorandum on European Company Statute, EUR. INDUS. REL. REV.,
Dec. 1988, at 26.
221 Internal Market and Industrial Cooperation: Statute for the European Com-
pany, supra note 219, at 8.
222 Id.
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The creation of specific legal instruments based upon European law
rather than national law which could be used by enterprises for cross-
frontier operations would further stimulate cooperation among enter-
prises. "Such legislation at the European level could at the same time
pioneer worker involvement in the decision-making structures of Euro-
pean industry.11
2 3
The Memorandum stated that:
[The proposed European company statute had] not been
looked at even at expert level since 1982 . . . [because] of a
long standing difficulty which stems from differences in tra-
ditions regarding participation by workers and company de-
cision-making: according to some, any such participation
must be voluntary, while for others it must be written into
statutory law relating to enterprises.224
Finding a satisfactory compromise between the two basic attitudes is
essential to the social dialogue. Additional Community instruments,
particularly in the company law sphere, must be established. Tradi-
tionally, this problem has been dealt with by coordinating the company
law of the nations involved in order to make the various national laws
equivalent. Industrial groups need a transnational company indepen-
dent of national laws that can concentrate substantial assets to compete
with American and Japanese businesses.
A European company statute must resolve the following issues:
(a) It must create a single system of company law which is totally
independent of national systems. To achieve this goal, it must introduce
solutions to legal problems which differ from national law and which
do not exist in any Member State's legislation. Regulation of the EEIG
has proven that this type of coexistence is possible.
(b) Rules governing the participation of workers in the structure
and decision-making processes of the European company, particularly
concerning supervision and the development of company strategy (not
at the daily management level) are "essential, since the multinational
company carrying out its business in the Community in accordance
with the different legislations has to comply with the whole range of
different arrangements as regards the role of employees within the com-
pany."22 The rules are also necessary because worker participation
plays an important part in daily industrial relations in many Member
States.
223 Id.
22 Id. at 8-9.
225 Id.
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The Commission noted that industry had previously welcomed the
concept of a European company but had found it difficult to accept a
statute that included a system of worker participation. On the other
hand, trade union representatives, particularly those from Member
States with worker participation systems at the national level, strongly
favor such a system. The EP also strongly supports participation
regulations.
Four main approaches for the resolution of this problem of em-
ployee participation may be considered:
-(i) The model in the statute itself, in which a supervisory board is
composed of one-third shareholder representatives, one-third worker
representatives, and one-third members elected by these two groups to
represent the general interest.
-(ii) The system existing in the country where the company is head-
quartered, along with added protection for the participatory rights ac-
quired by workers in branch establishments that are located in Member
States with participative legislation.
-(iii) A choice between the two principal schemes examined in the Fifth
Company Law Directive:
-workers elect no less than one third and no more than one half of
the members of the supervisory board (the German system);
-worker participation through a body representing the employees
that is separate from the company organs. This body must regularly
receive information about the company's business. The supervisory
board or the management must inform and consult this institution.
-(iv) Worker participation through collective bargaining agreements.
The first model, which dates back to an amendment made by the
EP, represents the most developed and ambitious form of participation
in the Commission's opinion. However, this model has not yet been
applied in any Member State, thus making it difficult to retain such an
approach at this stage.
The second approach fails to keep the European company inde-
pendent from significant legal ties with any national system. It would
result in the emergence of European companies which are distinguisha-
ble on the basis of varying national characteristics. It could also result
in the migration of companies to countries with the least stringent na-
tional, systems.
Therefore, a desirable system must necessarily satisfy certain
conditions:
(a) It must employ the participatory principles that are systemati-
cally practiced in certain Member States, while retaining the flexibility
to allow the various parties involved in a corporate undertaking to
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reach a consensus.
(b) It need not be uniform. Companies should be permitted to
choose between different schemes which reflect the accepted practices in
most Member States. The companies should then consult with the
workers who will be affected by the chosen scheme. Member States
should be permitted to restrict the choice to alleviate their fears that
companies will use the European company to avoid provisions of na-
tional law in this area. This restriction would, for example, give Ger-
many the authority to insist that companies formed on German terri-
tory apply a German participatory system. Of special importance is the
proposition that worker participation need not be introduced if opposed
by the company workers. This proposition can be enacted in two differ-
ent ways: obligatory worker participation, unless the workers vote
against it, or by making participation dependent upon a request from
the work force.
(c) The workers of the European company should benefit from the
same rights to information and consultation that exist in other firms in
the Community. The inclusion of more stringent rules in the statute is
not desirable at this stage. The issue should only be resolved in the
wider context of the social dialogue.
(d) With the exception of Germany and Portugal, the laws of the
Member States are based on the principle of a company's economic
independence. It is questionable whether the statute for a European
company is the proper arena for the creation of a body of rules gov-
erning groups of companies.
(e) The European company, like national companies, will be sub-
ject to the tax laws of the state in which it is domiciled. Double taxa-
tion agreements will also apply to the European company. Enterprises
may be attracted to the European company form by the leniency of
conditions under which losses suffered by the European company's es-
tablishments in other Member States or by foreign subsidiaries may be
deducted from the profits in the Member State of residence. The ac-
ceptance and utilization of the European company instrument by in-
dustry will depend to a large extent upon a satisfactory resolution of
this question of taxation.
(f) In its conclusions, the Commission emphasizes that enterprises
will be entirely free to choose whether they want to operate under the
revitalized European company statute. It would be transnational in
outlook to overcome the present legal difficulties surrounding associa-
tions or mergers between companies domiciled in different Member
States.
The Commission requested the Council, the EP and the two sides
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of industry to express their views on the Memorandum before the end
of 1988. It asked these groups to comment in particular on three key
questions: (1) The principle of an optional statute; (2) the indepen-
dence of such a statute from national laws; and, (3) the inclusion of the
three schemes for worker participation. After examining these views,
the Commission will again prepare a formal proposal for the statute.
7.3.
The Commission hopes to reach an agreement with the adversaries
of this proposal, as well as advocates of employee participation, thus
bringing to fruition the concept of a supranational European company.
The attempt to achieve a compromise after ten years of inactivity was
attacked at the July 1988 council meeting in Athens. Great Britain
balked at any statutory worker participation, while the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and other countries expressed concern that their na-
tional schemes could be undermined or evaded
7.3.1.
At its session in Madrid on October 6 and 7, 1988, the ETUC
Executive' Committee adopted a resolution which, in principle, wel-
comed the Commission's initiative to give new impetus to the discussion
of a European company.226 ETUC shared the Commission's view that
a solution which accounts for full worker participation in a company's
decision-making process must be found. ETUC stressed that this condi-
tion is essential for necessary economic restructuring and internal mar-
ket completion. The development of economic democracy in Europe is
absolutely imperative from a social perspective. Moreover, economic de-
mocracy would enhance the Community's prospects in world
competition.
With respect to the Commission's questions on the general concept
of the Memorandum, "ETUC considers a statute under autonomous
European law which is optional in nature to be useful provided that it
does not enable undertakings to evade the provisions of national legisla-
tion and collective agreements. The safeguarding of acquired rights
must form an integral part of the statute.)
227
The ETUC welcomes a European company founded on the basis
of consensus and considers the following basic conditions as absolute
228 See European Trade Union Confederation, Memorandum (Oct. 6-7, 1988)
(commenting in detail on COM No. 320 FINAL (July 15, 1988)). See also supra note
218 and accompanying text.
227 Id.
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requirements for economic democracy:
-The statute must provide an additional dimension of Euro-
pean participation by workers' representatives in company
decisions without undermining national participation rights.
-The possibilities for workers' representatives to exalt influ-
ence must be equivalent to those of the capital, irrespective of
the choice of model.
-The participation of workers' representatives at the level of
supervision and control must be a precondition for the estab-
lishment of the European company, irrespective of the model
chosen. Where collectively agreed systems are chosen, worker
participation with equal rights must be integral to the agree-
ment. Agreed renunciation of participation must be ruled
out.
-The trade unions at national and European level must be
provided with the possibility of instituting proceedings
through which it can be established whether an agreed par-
ticipation model complies with the requirements of the
statute.
-The capacity of the European company to conclude collec-
tive agreements must be embodied.228
ETUC is convinced that worker representation at the level of su-
pervision and control can only operate satisfactorily if the statute pro-
vides for worker representatives at the plant level who would continue
to be appointed according to national practice. Furthermore, ETUC
prefers that regulations concerning the information and consultation of
the employee representatives be established.229
7.3.2.
The UNICE position paper of November 7, 1988 expresses skep-
ticism with respect to the Council's adoption of a European company
statute. 30 Therefore, it suggests that the Commission assess the chances
of the adoption of such a statute after the Member States, the EP, and
the two sides of industry have all responded to the proposal. If the
Commission acts hastily, UNICE reasons, then considerable human
and financial resources could be wasted. Additionally, UNICE suggests
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Union des Industries de la CommunautE Europ~enne, UNICE Position Paper
22.6/13/1 (Nov. 7, 1988) (internal document).
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that the legal basis of a possible proposal be determined before a new
draft is presented.
In principle, the European company statute could be a useful legal
instrument for certain corporate restructurings within the Community.
However, it is not indispensable to the completion of the internal mar-
ket. Business will only favor this statute if it meets its needs, that is, if
it is a flexible instrument which does not impose unacceptable con-
straints, allows proper management of the company, and offers the nec-
essary legal certainty. For certain types of transnational company
groups, the European company statute would be an instrument which
would enable companies to form a much simpler group structure than
is possible under national laws. For transnational joint ventures or
company groups where participants do not wish to have a specific "na-
tionality," the European company statute could be regarded as neutral
and not linked to a particular Member State. For neutrality to occur,
however, the European company would need to be identical in all
Member States and not be required to have its registered office in a
specific Member State. If the statute departs from its independence of
national law by referring to that law in specific instances, the result
will not create a single European company statute, but twelve different
versions of the statute.
UNICE realizes that it will be very difficult to formulate a law on
company groups which is generally acceptable to all Member States.
The Commission's suggestion must doubtlessly be seen as an attempt to
prevent the debate on the European company statute from becoming
bogged down with a problem which will be difficult to resolve. There-
fore, UNICE supports the Commission's suggestion. In explanations
given by EEC officials at a briefing with UNICE on September 16,
1988, the Commission explained the possibility of referring the matter
of annual accounts to harmonized national law. However, UNICE
notes that the harmonization directive in question leaves Member
States with more than sixty options that previously have been employed
in distinct ways. Consequently, the degree of harmonization is very im-
perfect. The European company statute should have its own provisions
on the preparation and presentation of annual accounts based upon the
provisions of the Fourth and Seventh Directives. Fiscal questions pose a
special concern. In its Memorandum, the Commission accurately states
that a package of three proposed tax directives would facilitate cross-
border cooperation. UNICE has repeatedly expressed support for these
three proposals which have been under consideration since 1976 and
which were presented independently of the European company statute.
Therefore, since the proposals are not directly linked with the statute,
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UNICE advocates their adoption for the benefit of all companies. Also,
taxation should not be restricted to European companies with branches
or subsidiaries in other Member States since it would discriminate
against companies with branches or subsidiaries under national law.
The taxation proposals should apply to all company groups which are
active in more than one Member State.
Understandably, special attention is paid to employee participa-
tion. A formula which the Commission still considers to be "the most
developed and ambitious form of participation" was included in the
Commission's first proposal, which failed in 1982.2"1 UNICE criticizes
this statement because this formula for employee participation does not
currently exist in any Member State. Member States with participatory
schemes only apply their regulations to companies employing a certain
number of workers. Therefore, the European company statute might
initially be confined to companies with fewer than a given number of
employees, for instance a threshold of 1,000 employees. This limit
would allow the statute to quickly affect a certain category of compa-
nies and simultaneously facilitate empirical analysis while solutions are
developed for the participatory problem of companies which exceed the
threshold. UNICE members from EEC countries without mandatory
employee participation schemes favor the referral of worker participa-
tion back to the national law of the country in which the company is
established.
Although the European company statute is simply one option for
companies to consider, opposition to the formulation of proposals on
employee participation stems from concerns that a formula contained in
the statute could be considered a model for future harmonization of
national laws. Another criticism is that it could become a bargaining
issue between management and labor. A company in difficulty might
find it hard to resist adopting the statute.
UNICE delegations from EEC countries with legislation on em-
ployee representation on the supervisory board consider it unrealistic to
adopt a statute which does not contain a formula for employee partici-
pation from which the company could choose. Therefore, the Commis-
sion's approach seems to be acceptable to these Member States. How-
ever, these nations believe that the three options in the Memorandum
are insufficient and leave many critical questions unanswered. It is sur-
prising that the Commission, without explanation, has omitted the
Dutch and French systems as possible options. The description of the
231 Internal Market and Industrial Cooperation: Statute for the European Com-
pany, supra note 219, at 14.
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German system in the Memorandum is not entirely accurate because it
disregards the fact that German law provides for casting votes on the
shareholder's side. The ability to cast votes "enshrined in law and
geared to practical needs is essential where there is equal representa-
tion on the board. 23 2
With respect to the matter of employee information and consulta-
tion, the Memorandum suggests a referral to the law and practices of
the various countries where the company's activities are performed.
UNICE believes that this approach is realistic because the Commission
would not be able to formulate generally acceptable, uniform rules on
employee information and consultation for the purposes of the Euro-
pean company. The idea of establishing a compulsory "European meet-
ing place" for the various components of a European company could
result in the creation of bureaucratic bodies which would increase a
company's expenses without conferring any benefit to the company. 233
7.3.3.
By an overwhelming majority, at its 260th Plenary Session on No-
vember 24, 1988 the ESC adopted an opinion which welcomes the at-
tempts to revive the deliberations on a statute for a European com-
pany.23 4 The ESC believes that the statute can contribute to the
completion of the single European market if it is given a practical form.
However, a final assessment of the statute will not be feasible until the
complete revised version of the proposal is available.
The ESC comments that the creation of an additional legal struc-
ture which would accompany the Member States' national laws is ap-
propriate and necessary. Thus, firms would be free to decide in favor of
the new statute or continue to utilize national company law.
The ESC agrees that worker participation should be regulated in
the European company statute. In view of the considerably different
level of worker participation, the ESC concurs "that the worker partici-
pation arrangements laid down in the European company statute need
not necessarily be uniform" and considers it important to avoid rigid,
binding structures. 35 However, the decision to adopt one of the various
232 See UNICE, supra note 230.
233 Id.
"34 European Social Committee, Document 1233/88 (Nov. 24, 1988), published
in 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 23) 36 (1989). In its opinion on the proposal for the
control of concentrations between undertakings, the ESC urged the Council and the
Commission "to step up and properly organize their overdue action on the company
law front." 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 208) 11, 12 (1988).
"I 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 23) 36, 38 (1989).
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possible participation systems "must be the subject of consultations be-
tween the trade unions represented in the companies or their in-com-
pany representatives (works councils, in-house committees etc.) and the
management of the company concerned, in order to reach an
agreement."' 36
Regardless of which system is adopted, it is essential to define its
content. The collectively agreed upon systems of participation must be
similar to the other solutions proposed in the Memorandum. A share-
holders' vote is required to finalize decisions. The Committee agrees to
exclude from the statute any rules about participation at plant level and
shares the Commission's view that the workers be given adequate infor-
mation. The international integration highlights the problem of worker
information and consultation in companies belonging to multinational
groups whose decision-making center is located outside the Community.
Therefore, the Committee asks the Commission "to give thought-not
just in connection with the European company statute, of course-to
the need to ensure that consultation takes place at the levels where deci-
sions are made on the distribution of production and labour which
could affect the position of workers employed in European
subsidiaries."
237
Thus, the ESC, like ETUC and UNICE, welcomed the initiative
of the Commission, but did not see a possibility of expressing a final
opinion due to the problem of worker participation.
7.3.4.
The reports of both the EP Committee on Iegal Affairs and Citi-
zens Rights and the EP Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
and Industrial Policy 238 reflected the extreme inquietud of the EP re-
garding both the Memorandum presented by the Commission and the
entire policy regarding worker participation. The discussion of these
reports in the plenum on March 14, 1989, and the vote taken thereaf-
ter, added paragraphs to the Resolution which further manifested the
disappointment of the EP.
2 9
In its Resolution replying to the Memorandum, the EP points out
that the achievement of a single market must benefit all participants in
the economic process and the wishes of wage-earning employees to con-
tribute in the decision-making process must be considered. Develop-
2386 Id. at 38-39.
237 Id. at 39.
231 1989 EUR. PARL. REP. (No. A 2-405/88) 1 (Feb. 24, 1989).
239 1989-1990 EuR. PARL. DEB. (No. 2-376) 28, 75 (Mar. 14, 1989).
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ments in European undertakings like Thompson Grand Public and
Bull (where European employee representations have been agreed upon
by negotiations) are expressly welcomed. The EP considers the Euro-
pean company statute a valuable mechanism for restructuring the Eu-
ropean undertaking. In particular, the EP believes that the statute will
improve European companies' ability to effectively compete in the
world market. References to national company law are admissible in all
cases where company law has already been sufficiently harmonized.
The three directives relating to the harmonization of taxes must be has-
tened. The EP is also amenable to the choice of options offered by the
statute to the undertakings.
The EP recommends the adoption of the tripartite model which it
developed in 1974 and which the Commission adopted in its amended
proposal in 1975. This confirms the EP's previous position expressed in
its Opinion on the proposal for a Fifth Directive, where it regarded the
suggested worker participation models as equivalent. 240 Restriction by
the Member States on the freedom of choice counters the purposes of
the system. Even if restriction would increase the acceptability of the
European company statute, management and staff must reach agree-
ment on a model of worker participation.
It is essential to bring employee information and consultation ar-
rangements within the European company framework. Therefore, the
new proposal of the Commission should include provisions for repre-
sentation of employees similar to the 1975 amended proposal which
included a special section on "The European Works Council."24 Sim-
ply referring back to the existing directives and the outcome of the dia-
logue between the two sides of industry is totally unsatisfactory.
The EP takes the view that the European company must be able
to conclude collective labor agreements with the trade unions in order
to eliminate the major discrepancies that exist between the different
Member States with respect to working conditions, remuneration, and
social security. In this context, the EP asks the Commission to provide
a directive enabling the European company to conclude collective wage
agreements.242
240 The Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights expresses in its Report
surprise that the "so-called 'Dutch system' of co-option to the supervisory body with
the option for workers of opposing the election of certain members" has not been in-
cluded in the choices. See 1989 EUR. PARL. REP. (No. A 2-405/88) 1 (Feb. 24, 1989).
241 See Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for European Compa-
nies, supra note 199, at 57-65.
2,42 The Committee believes that worker participation based upon collective wage
agreements, the "Swedish model," presupposes a fully developed base of social legisla-
tion in all Member States. No base of social legislation presently exists, nor is it likely
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The most interesting comment of the EP Committee on Legal Af-
fairs and Citizens Rights concerns the legal basis for a European com-
pany statute. The original proposal, as well as the amended proposal,
were based upon Article 235 of the EEC Treaty.243 The Commitee
questioned the need to rely on this provision since Article 100A of the
Treaty may serve as an alternative legal basis.244 The creation of a
European company statute would achieve one of the objectives of Arti-
cle 8 and, consequently, also contribute to the objective of creating the
internal market. The European company would operate in economic
terms with an effect comparable to the establishment of companies
through cross-frontier merger. After withdrawing the proposal for a
Tenth Directive, the statute could also be understood in a technical
sense as a measure for approximating laws.
Article 100A, paragraph 2,245 excludes the application of Article
100A from provisions governing taxation, free movement, and the
rights and interests of workers. Free movement is not involved, and the
tax provisions are only of an incidental character. Whether the provi-
sion governs the rights and interests of workers, and this is not subject
to the application of Article 100A, depends upon the interpretation.
If Para. 2 is understood simply to mean that the rights en-
compassed in the so-called Vredeling Directive are to be un-
derstood in that context, then Para. 2 would not preclude
worker participation rights. But even if this interpretation
were not accepted, there would still be another way out: the
rules on worker participation and the informing and consult-
ing of workers could be taken out of the statute and put into
a separate directive that could be based on Article 54.3(d).246
If both legal instruments constitute a single policy unit, the Council
could adopt them with a qualified majority after a second reading in
Parliament. This argument is of great importance because it shows the
intention of the EP to introduce worker participation even against the
express wishes of some Member States.
The EP asked the Commission to submit a proposal upon which
Parliament can deliver its opinion as soon as possible. 247 The EP's
to exist in the foreseeable future. Therefore, this model requires either far-reaching
framework provisions or the achievement of substantive minimum criteria. See id. at
10-11.
243 See id. at 12; Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 235, at 91.
24 See 1988-1989 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM No. 405) 1, 12 (1989).
245 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 8 (1987).
248 1988-1989 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM No. 405) 1, 12 (1989),
24 See id. at 7.
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strong and somewhat aggressive statements were generally interpreted
as an indication that the EP wants to enforce a decision of the Council
on worker participation.
24 8
7.3.5.
As in all legislative matters, the final decision belongs to the Coun-
cil. Therefore, it is interesting to observe the attitudes expressed by
Member States.
At an informal Council meeting in Athens in July 1988, it became
obvious that the United Kingdom rigorously rejects any legally enforce-
able regulation of worker participation. The Federal Republic of Ger-
many and other Member States expressed concern that their national
legislation could be weakened or diluted. The Greek presidency
presented a compromise formula which would require all Member
States to introduce obligatory schemes of worker participation, but
would allow each individual enterprise to adopt the system of its
choice.24 9 Lord Young, the British Trade Secretary, stated in an inter-
view that "the government would resist any attempts to introduce the
so-called European Company Statute, facilitating varying degrees of
worker participation in company decision-making, insisting that what
might be good for West Germany was not necessarily good for
Britain."25
The French Minister for European Affairs hopes that France can
accelerate the adoption of a European company statute which includes
worker participation elements. In an open letter, the President of the
French Employers Association (Patronat) argues against any idea of a
Social Europe which might increase industry's costs or limit the free-
dom of management to manage. French trade unions asked the French
government to press for the adoption of a social charter through direc-
tives which would become part of the national law, thus providing the
opportunity to call upon the European Court of Justice.25'
The German Government is in a difficult position. It would have
preferred the Commission to have presented its ideas in detail, rather
than issuing the Memorandum which raised new questions. Worker
218 See, e.g., Scotto, Le Parlement de Strasbourg pousse les feux de l'Europe
sociale, Le Monde, Mar. 17, 1989, at 31, col. 1; Handelsblatt, Mar. 16, 1989, at 4;
Handelsblatt, Mar. 1, 1989, at 1; Handelsblatt, Feb. 24/25, 1989, at 1.
249 Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Aug. 1, 1988, at 4; Neue Ziircher Zeitung, July 31,
1988, at 12.
250 The Times (London), Jan. 31, 1989, at 21, col. 1.
25, Le Monde, May 3, 1989, at 33; Financial Times (London), Apr. 28, 1989, at
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participation remains the principal problem to be resolved.252 In an of-
ficial statement of November 25, 1988, the German Bundesrat (Second
Chamber) reiterated that the principle of worker participation is an
inevitable precondition for any modern enterprise law.253 Therefore,
this principle must also be included in the proposed European company
statute and have a binding effect on all Member States. The Bundesrat
rejects the possibility of choosing between a "German model" and the
other models mentioned in the Memorandum, because these models
possess many important differences with respect to the intensity of
worker participation and, therefore, cannot be considered equivalent.
The Bundesrat considers any system which would enable German en-
terprises to evade the existing German Mitbestimmung unacceptable.
To avoid further divergencies in the legal system, the Bundesrat be-
lieves that the European company should be a uniform European legal
instrument, independent of national company laws. Differences be-
tween existing national company laws and a European company law
cannot be tolerated, lest the evasion of existing national rules which
protect shareholders and creditors would occur. Granting one-sided tax
advantages to the European company would result in considerable dis-
tortions of competitive situations and would be particularly disadvanta-
geous to small and medium-sized enterprises which will probably not
use the instrument of a European company. In principle, the Bundesrat
favors efforts to create an independent transnational type of company,
but this proposal requires cross-frontier cooperation to harmonize legal
structures which currently exist in the company laws of the
Community.
2 54
The German Minister of Justice, when addressing the problem of
worker participation, suggested that it was surprising that the Commis-
sion had not yet presented the idea of a European company with lim-
ited liability, such as a holding company or a joint subsidiary of a na-
tional enterprise. If the size of such "Euro-GmbH" would be limited,
the problem of worker participation would not arise. In his opinion, the
Commission should investigate whether this concept could further Eu-
ropean integration.
2 55
22 Handelsblatt, Oct. 20, 1988, at 5.
23 Decision of Deutscher Bundesrat 392/88 (Nov. 25, 1988).
214 See id.
11" See Engelhard, Defizite im Gesellschaftsrecht bei der Vorbereitung auf den
offenen EG-Markt, Handelsblatt, Dec. 30/31, 1989, at 6. The German Minister of
Labor, Norbert Bliim, raised the question of whether it is worthwhile to sacrifice the
successful practice of co-determination rights in the Federal Republic of Germany, in
return for small steps forward in the direction of a European company law. Id.
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7.4.
The Commission did not discuss in detail the various opinions ex-
pressed in reply to the Memorandum. Instead, on August 25, 1989, the
Commission presented a new draft of the European Company Statute
consisting of two parts, a regulation and a directive: (1) the Proposal
for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European company;
256
and (2) a Proposal for a Council Directive complementing the Statute
for a European company with regard to the involvement of employees
in the European company.25 The draft regulation for the European
Company Statute is based on article 100A of the Single European Act
because the Commission believes the Statute is related to the creation of
the internal market. The proposed directive is based on Article 54 and
contains regulations concerning employee participation in the supervi-
sion and strategic development of the European company. The Com-
mission points out that the provisions of the directive "form an indis-
sociable complement to the provisions of [the Regulation] and it is
therefore necessary to ensure that the two sets of provisions are applied
concomitantly. 258 The purpose of splitting the original draft into two
different parts is to overcome the expected opposition of the United
Kingdom which would prevent acceptance if unanimous vote had been
required. The system chosen by the Commission will require only a
qualified majority vote for eventual adoption by the Council. In sub-
stance, the Commission sees worker participation as an integral element
of the European Company Statute. 59
The draft has been considerably reduced. Of the original 284 arti-
cles, only 137 articles are considered necessary. This reduction has been
achieved by cross-referencing the Statute to existing or draft regula-
tions. One of the changes made to the draft was to reduce the minimum
share capital to ECU 100,000.260 The purpose of this change is to
256 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL
REGULATION ON THE STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY, COM No. 268 FINAL -
SYN 218 (Aug. 25, 1989), published in 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 263) 41 (1989)
[hereinafter NEW DRAFT REGULATION].
257 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL
DIRECTIVE COMPLEMENTING THE STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY WITH RE-
GARD TO THE INVOLVEMENT OF EMPLOYEES IN THE EUROPEAN COMPANY, COM
No. 268 FINAL - SYN 219 (Aug. 25, 1989), published in 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C
263) 69 (1989) [hereinafter NEW DRAFT DIRECTIVE].
258 NEW DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 257, at 69.
259 For a summary and evaluation see Kolvenbach, Statut ftr die Europdische
Aktiengesellschaft, 39 Der Betrieb 1957 (1989). Spitzer, L'Avant Projet de Sae et la
Soci&t de Droit Europien, Une Chance Pour les Entreprises de la C.E.E., 1989 GA-
ZETTE DU PALAIS, Doctrine, at 721.
260 NEW DRAFT REGULATION, supra note 256, art. 4, at 43.
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make it easier for small businesses to take advantage of the Statute. To
facilitate the administration of a European company, the title concern-
ing annual accounts and consolidated accounts has also been stream-
lined considerably by referring to the provisions of already existing
directives.26 a
In further deliberations of the Commission's proposal, the most
controversial point will be the employee participative rules. The draft
directive clarifies that these rights cover the supervisory aspects of man-
agement and not administrative questions. Corporate strategy includes
relocation, restructuring, joint ventures, mergers and closures. It is
quite clear that a European company may not be established without
some form of employee participation with respect to these matters. If no
agreement on the model can be reached, management has the final
choice.
The three models available are the same as suggested in the Com-
mission's Memorandum on the new Statute for a European
Company:262
- (i) At least one-third and not more than one-half of the members of
the supervisory board or the administrative board shall be appointed by
the employees of the SE or their representatives.
- (ii) Members of the supervisory board or the administrative board
shall be co-opted by the board. The general meeting of shareholders or
the representatives of the employees may, on specific grants, object to
the appointment of a particular candidate. In such a case, an indepen-
dent body established under public law decides on the objection.
- (iii) A separate body shall represent the employees of the European
company. The number of members and detailed rules governing their
election or appointment shall be included in the statutes of the SE in
consultation with the representatives of the employees of the founder
companies and in accordance with the laws or practices of the Member
States.
The model adopted must be agreed upon by the management
board or the administrative board of the founder companies and the
representatives of the employees of those companies. Other models cho-
sen may be adopted by agreement between management and the repre-
sentatives of the employees. Such an agreement requires the approval of
both the employees and the general meeting of the European company.
Each Member State may restrict the choice of models listed in the draft
directive or may make one model compulsory for all European compa-
281 Id. tit. V, at 61-64.
212 See notes 217-25 and accompanying text.
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nies having their registered office in the territory of the Member State.
Additionally, other models may be adopted by agreement between the
management board or the administrative board of the founder compa-
nies and the employees or their representatives in those companies.
In all models, workers' representatives are guaranteed the same
rights to information and consultation. They have to be informed at
least once every three months of the progress of the company's business,
including undertakings controlled by it, and of its prospects. Confiden-
tiality of information must be observed. Information may be withheld if
the law of the Member State where the European company has its
registered office permits such withholding and the disclosure might se-
riously jeopardize the interests of the company or disrupt its projects.
There is no threshold for introducing participative systems, but
one of these systems is obligatory for each European company. In prin-
ciple, the Commission has included in its proposal a more or less sim-
plified version of the Draft Fifth Directive.
8. CONCLUSION
The attempt of the Commission to revive the discussion on a Eu-
ropean company is also an attempt to find a solution for the worker
participation problems which have become obstacles for the completion
of the company law harmonization program. It is difficult to predict
whether the options offered will be acceptable to a majority of the
Member States, provided that this topic is suitable for a majority deci-
sion in the Council. Member States like the United Kingdom, without
historically grown information and consultation rights for employees
and without existing worker participative schemes, are still opposed to
any EEC legislative attempt to enforce adoption-of such schemes. The
discussion of the "Vredeling Saga"2 63 is partially responsible for the
enduring objections and opposition. The difficulty of harmonizing the
existing worker participation systems in Europe is demonstrated by the
variety of models offered. It should not be overlooked that Member
States which possess a worker participation scheme base their practice
on a historically grown attitude of cooperation between labor and man-
agement. Existing legislation has been interpreted by national courts,
and management and labor have adapted to the practical aspects of this
cooperation.
But even Member States with a long history of employee partici-
pation object to any solution which might result in changes in their
2. See supra notes 122-41 and accompanying text.
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present systems. This resistance results from the fact that, in most of
these countries, the legislative basis for such systems is the result of
political compromises which are solidly entrenched. Attempts to influ-
ence these systems by transnational obligations might result in internal
political problems. In an interview, Commission President Jacques
Delors promised that employees would have available a "menu A la
carte" which takes into consideration the various situations and which
gives employees a choice between worker participation under the Ger-
man model, the Swedish model based upon collective agreement for the
enterprise, as well as a system of works councils and trade union repre-
sentation under the French or Italian model.264
The Swedish model, worker participation through collectively
agreed upon systems within the company, will become increasingly im-
portant. Member States with a legislative base for employee participa-
tion would have difficulties operating the Swedish System concurrently
with stringent legislation. ETUC wisely remarks in its Resolution that
the binding recognition of collectively agreed upon arrangements could
well become one of "the thorniest issues in the coordination of national
and European law. '2 65 UNICE's position paper raises issues which
would need to be answered if this option becomes part of the final reg-
ulation. The most difficult question to resolve will be the consequences
of the situation where there is no reachable agreement. The ESC men-
tions the problem of Member States in which worker participation at
the company level is governed exclusively by legislation, and the EP
wants the European company to have the opportunity to conclude col-
lective labor agreements with trade unions.
The revised draft of 1975 already indicated the possibility of
reaching collective agreements with trade unions represented in estab-
lishments of the European company found in Article 146.266 Article
147267 adds that conditions of employment governed by a collective
agreement shall apply directly to and be binding upon all employees of
the European company who are members of a trade union which is a
party to that collective agreement. At that time, the transnational Euro-
pean collective agreement was seen primarily as an instrument to regu-
late wages and working conditions.2 68 A certain preference for contrac-
tual rather than legislative measures exists, particularly in the United
264 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Aug. 30, 1988, at 4.
265 European Trade Union Confederation, supra note 226.
See Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for European Compa-
nies, supra note 199, art. 146, at 68.
267 See id. at 69.
266 See Steinberg, Der Europaische Tarifvertrag, 1971 RDA 18.
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Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and Italy. But even in countries where
legislative instruments are primarily used, collective agreements are ac-
quiring a growing importance for certain matters such as the introduc-
tion of new technologies. Therefore, collective agreements could eventu-
ally play an important role in the implementation of EC Directives.
This would facilitate solutions which give consideration to the differ-
ences existing in national labor and industrial relations systems.269 A
recourse to collective agreements could be one resolution of the Euro-
pean worker participation dilemma. The trade unions have recognized
this possibility and the European Metal Workers Association ("EMB")
already demands EWC's contractual basis to bridge the time until the
Council creates a basis for works councils in transnational corpora-
tions.2 " Thus, an interim substitute for the Vredeling Proposal regard-
ing information and consultation of employees could be established.
It will be interesting to observe the future events which will deter-
mine whether.the company law directives originally developed by the
Commission can be realized. If it is not possible to find a solution for
worker participation in the European company, achieving a European
company statute will become a difficult task.
269 See Adinolfi, The Implementation of Social Policy Directives Through Collec-
tive Agreements?, 25 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 291 (1988).
" Mitbestimmungsrecht fir Arbeitnehmer in den multi-nationalen Konzernen,
Handelsblatt, Apr. 13, 1989, at 6.
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